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Abstract
The information era has made it difficult to protect and secure one’s
personal information. One such struggle is that of identity theft, a
crime that has caused great suffering to its victims. Offenders guilty
of the crime use the identities of their victims for the purpose of enter-
tainment or fraud. Social media has extended the capability of people
to interact and share information, but without the appropriate guide-
lines to protect individuals from becoming victims of identity theft.
There is a lack of studies on identity theft and its determinants. The
purpose of the research is therefore to assist with the prevention of
identity theft by determining the effect that information-sharing on
social media has on the risk of individuals becoming identity theft
victims. The details of reported identity theft victims were collected
from the South African Fraud Prevention Services. Data on individ-
uals’ information-sharing habits on social media networks, like Face-
book and LinkedIn, was collected via surveys that were sent to a
relevant group at the Stellenbosch University. It was found that the
two variables, Age and Gender, were the greatest predictors of iden-
tity theft victims. A prediction model was developed that serves as
a tool to score individuals as high-risk or low-risk victims according
to their attributes and social media information-sharing habits. The
findings benefit research on the prevention of identity theft, by raising
awareness of the potential risks the sharing of sensitive data on social
media has.
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Opsomming
Die tegnologiese era het dit moeilik gemaak vir individue om hulle
persoonlike inligting te beskerm. Identiteitsdiefstal is ’n voorbeeld
hiervan en veroorsaak lyding onder slagoffers. Oortreders, skuldig
aan hierdie misdaad, gebruik die identiteite van hulle slagoffers bloot
vir vermaak of bedrog. Die vooruitgaan van tegnologie en die tot-
standkoming van sosiale media het dit vir die mens vergemaklik, om
persoonlike inligting te deel sonder die gepaste voorsorgmaatree¨ls.
Daar is ’n tekort aan inligting rakende studies oor identiteitsdiefstal
en die bepalers daarvan. Die doel van hierdie navorsing is om by te
dra tot die voorkoming van identiteitsdiefstal, deur die tendense te
bepaal in die persoonlike inligting wat sosiale media gebruikers op
die netwerke verskaf, vir beide die wat al slagoffers was of nie. In-
ligting van verklaarde identiteitsdiefstal slagoffers is verkry vanaf die
South African Fraud Prevention Services. Steekproefopnames is uit-
gestuur na relevante groepe in die Stellenbosch Universiteit rekenaar
netwerk. Die inligting rakende individue se gewoontes om persoon-
like inligting op sosiale media netwerke, soos Facebook en LinkedIn te
deel, is verkry van die bogenoemde steekproefopnames. Ouderdom en
Geslag is gevind as die kernbepalers van identiteitsdiefstal slagoffers.
’n Model is ontwikkel wat gedien het as ’n instrument, om individue
as hoe¨- of lae-risiko slagoffers te bepunt, volgens hulle kenmerke en die
persoonlike inligting wat hul op sosiale media deel. Die bevindinge
dra by tot die navorsing rakende die voorkoming van identiteitsdief-
stal deur die bewusmaking van die potensie¨le risikos, wat gepaard
gaan daarmee om sensitiewe inligting op sosiale media te deel.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter serves as an introduction that gives background information on the
research question, it states the research objectives and discusses the research
strategy.
1.1 Background to the research hypothesis
The information era has introduced great struggles into the lives of individuals.
This era has made it difficult to protect and secure one’s personal information.
One such struggle is that of identity theft, a crime that has caused great suffering
to its victims. Offenders guilty of the crime use the identities of their victims
to steal money, obtain loans and generally violate the law (Saunders & Zucker,
1999).
In South Africa, as in most countries, the problem arises because most people
are na¨ıve when opening online accounts and are markedly careless with their per-
sonal information. Social media has extended the capability of people to interact
and share information, but without the appropriate guidelines. Details such as
identity numbers, contact details and physical addresses are freely available on
social media. Through various channels criminals can create an identity book and
proof of address, thus having enough information to open a bank account, which
will be billed to the original identity document’s owner. In some cases, fraudulent
accounts are even opened with the data of deceased individuals. South Africa is
one of the top three countries internationally with the highest rates of fraud using
1
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recycled deceased identities (Alfreds, 2015c). Social media has immensely simpli-
fied the ability of obtaining an individual’s personal information. Information is
exploding on the internet and individuals have lost control over it.
The increase in the volume, velocity and variety of data online has steered
society to the age of big data (He et al., 2014). Social media is an important
contributor to the big data regime. This enormous amount of data, big data,
requires new technologies and architectures to process data and acquire results
(Katal et al., 2013). Technologies like Hadoop together with MapReduce and the
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) are both options to query and analyse
extremely large data sets. Metadata infrastructures like the Resource Description
Framework (RDF) provide a general framework which can be used to graphically
represent insights emerging from big data.
Big data is a developing field that has the potential to generate results that
are extra reliable. The use of big data can lead to more precise, constant and
dependable measurements. Better predictions can be made and experiments can
be conducted based on data rather than gut feel or intuition.
1.2 Rationale of research
Identity theft is a crucial problem worldwide and an accelerating problem in South
Africa. According to a study by tech firm IBM, one billion parts of personal
information were lost in South Africa in 2014, costing the country R432 256 000.
Unfortunately, cyber thieves increased their deeds in 2015, with costs running up
to R465 412 000 in July. The challenge for society is to minimise the chance of
becoming part of these statistics (Alfreds, 2015b).
According to Reyns & Henson (2015) there is a major lack of studies on
identity theft and its determinants. Reyns & Henson (2015) state, ‘Considering
the possible link between online activities and identity theft, research is needed
to identify risk factors for online victimization’.
The purpose of the research is therefore to assist the country and individuals
with the prevention of the cybercrime, identity theft, and to raise awareness of
the potential risks the sharing of certain sensitive data on social media might
have.
2
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If the research results in a definite conclusion and social media vulnerability
can be connected to identity theft, the benefits expected from the research to
science or society will be to raise awareness of the potential risks the sharing
of certain sensitive data on social media might have. Recommendations for the
managing of social media accounts can then be made.
1.3 Research hypothesis
People are not cautious when sharing personal information on social media plat-
forms. Personal details such as identity numbers, contact details and physical
addresses are posted without second thought. Individuals are thus unaware of
the effect their social media interaction has on the risk of them becoming identity
theft victims.
It is anticipated that there should be a recognisable difference between the
amount of data that is shared by identity theft victims compared to that of people
who have not been offended with the crime.
Furthermore it is hypothesised that the attributes commonly found in historic
identity theft victim cases are the attributes that will serve as important predictor
variables in a model that classifies individuals as high-risk or low-risk victims of
identity theft.
1.4 Aim and objectives
In order to address the research hypothesis effectively, the following objectives
must be met:
1. Determine the attributes that have noteworthy correlations with victims of
identity theft.
2. Develop a method to estimate vulnerability scores for individuals based on
the data they have revealed on social media.
3. Build a prediction model that best classifies identity theft victims.
3
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4. Determine the variables that best predict identity theft victims.
5. Use the prediction model to score new data as either at high risk of identity
theft or at low risk according to their social media information-sharing
habits.
1.5 Proposed research methodology
Data on actual identity theft incidents will be collected. The data must contain
personal attributes that describe the victims. Data on individuals’ sharing of
information activities on social media networks, like Facebook and LinkedIn, will
then be collected via the method of web crawling. Data will be ingested onto the
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) and then processed and cleaned with
MapReduce. Hadoop is an open source framework that provides a shared storage
and analysis system. The storage is provided by HDFS and the analysis by the
programming paradigm, MapReduce. The previously offended victims’ attribute
outcomes will be used to determine predictor variables that will serve as reference
variables throughout the processing of the data. To group and visually graph this
information, a technique called the Resource Description Framework (RDF) will
be used.
The RDF is a general purpose language for representing information on the
web. One of the main applications of the RDF is the integration of data. Data
is structured in graphs with vertices and edges. The format of the RDF data
model enables the model to be easily reconstructed compared to the complex
reconstruction of a relational model. A query language such as SPARQL can
then be used to manipulate and retrieve data stored in RDF format.
The data on individual’s social media sharing habits will be grouped with
RDFs and used to estimate the vulnerability of these individuals based on the
amount and type of personal data they have shared on social media. The Hadoop
project, Jena, will then be used to compare the data for previous identity theft
victims and the data for non-victims to determine if there is a significant difference
in the type of data shared by the two groups.
4
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The data on individual’s social media sharing habits will then be used to build
prediction models that classify individuals as either high- or low-risk identity theft
victims and to determine the variables that best predict identity theft victims.
SPARQL will be used to mine the RDF models and to build the prediction models.
The data analysis results found with the models will be used to accept or reject
the hypothesis.
1.6 Research proposal summary
In conclusion it is determined that there is a lack of studies done on identity
theft and its determinants. Social media is a big contributor to the amount of
individuals’ personal information available online, which assists perpetrators with
the crime of identity theft. It is therefore planned to conduct a study on identity
theft and social media literature. Data will be collected on historic identity
theft victims, and the social media sharing habits of individuals. The data will
be used to build a prediction model and the results will assist society with the
identification of identity theft determinants and be used to classify individuals as
high- or low-risk victims.
5
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Chapter 2
Literature Study
This chapter gives an overview of the literature relevant to the study. Data was
collected from the sources described in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Literature Review Sources.
2.1 Identity theft
Identity theft became a national crime in 1998 in the United States. Today iden-
tity theft is an increasing problem worldwide (Reyns, 2013). In South Africa,
6
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residents are seen as sitting ducks when discussing the crime. Government, bank-
ing and other corporate databases are leaked and are currently being spread by
criminals around the world (News24, 2015a).
2.1.1 Identity theft definition
According to Reyns (2013), identity theft is a term used to describe particular
crimes, which include the use of an individual’s personal information, without
their approval or permission, to commit a crime. The Identity Theft Assumption
and Deterrence Act agree with Reyns (2013) that identity theft happens when
an individual’s identity is knowingly used, without consent, to commit an illegal
activity. Identity theft is often confused with identity fraud. Reyns (2013) clar-
ifies that identity theft is a category of identity fraud. The ultimate differences
between identity theft and fraud are first consent and secondly if the identity is
owned by a person (Reyns, 2013). For the purpose of the study, identity theft
is defined as the unlawful act when one’s personal information is used, without
consent, to either commit a crime such as credit theft or for the illegal activity
of impersonation.
2.1.2 Crime types
Crimes committed with the personal information of victims include (Reyns, 2013):
• The illegal application for credit;
• Banking fraud like loans;
• Posing as a letting or estate agent to receive deposits (Maluleke & Pheko, 2015);
• Document fraud like a driver’s licence; and
• The unlawful application for governmental benefits.
Offenders depend on the good reputation of their victims in order for them
to use the benefits that victims qualify for (Dirk, 2015b).
7
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2.1.3 How identities are acquired
According to Reyns (2013) the most common methods of acquiring the identities
of victims are: personal data online; phishing; skimming; hacking; and theft of
actual identification documents. This study focuses on the stealing of personal
data that is shared online.
By knowing how offenders acquire the details of their victims, individuals who
develop online spaces can decrease the crime of identity theft by designing these
spaces in such a manner that makes these acquisition methods impossible (Reyns
& Henson, 2015).
2.1.4 Identity theft cases
Cases of identity theft are progressing due to the information explosion on the
internet. Table 2.1 lists identity theft incidents that actually happened in South
Africa.
8
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Table 2.1: Cases of Identity Theft.
Type Case
Actual
document
theft
A resident from Pretoria wanted to open a First National Bank account,
but to his surprise, an account had already been opened in his name and
with his unique identity number. It was determined that the offender used
his official identity document, which he had lost four years prior to the
event. (Makhubu, 2015)
Actual
document
theft
The stolen identity of an individual was used to take out a life insurance
policy worth one million rand. After a few months had passed, it was then
claimed that the individual had died. A corpse was bought for R20 000
from the King Edward Hospital to obtain a death certificate. (Hlophe,
2015)
Personal
data
online
Perpetrators used stolen identities from dating sites to buy and ship illegal
products. The fraud was discovered after a woman reported the receipt of
an suspicious package from a person she met online. The package enclosed
a request that she had to reship it to Pretoria. (Cronje, 2015)
Fake
letting
agent
A Cape Town local paid a deposit to rent a house and signed a lease, but
on arrival found out that the property belonged to someone else and the
letting agent, to whom he had paid the deposit and with whom he had
confirmed the lease, was a duplicate of the official agent and not the real
agent himself. (Maluleke & Pheko, 2015)
Fake
estate
agent
When a woman tried to sell her home, she was astonished to find out that
someone, posing as her, had already sold her home. The criminal went to
the conveyancer and signed documents under her name. It is not known
how the offender acquired her details. (Barbeau, 2015)
Recruit-
ment
Scam
Criminals posing as the company Netcare 911 sent out messages to the
public that Netcare 911 was offering training for paramedics. When
individuals then applied to the advertisement, their personal details were
stolen and they were required to make payments to the fraudulent
account. (News24, 2015b)
2.1.5 The impact of identity theft on South Africa
It is of foremost importance to recognise that identity theft is not only a problem
in South Africa, but an increasing issue globally. According to SABC (2015), the
estimated global cost of identity theft is 450 billion dollars per year. It is found
9
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that in Canada out of 100 000 individuals, 11.5 % were identity theft victims in
2013 and of the entire United Kingdom in 2012, 8.8 %, costing 3.3 billion pounds,
were found to have been victims. Statistics show that in 2012, 7 % of all families
in the United States were already identity theft victims and this number has
increased ever since (Reyns & Henson, 2015).
In South Africa identity theft has escalated by more than 200 percent over
the past six years and prime victims are men from Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal
between the ages of 28 and 40 (Dirk, 2015b) and (Erasmus, 2015). Ngwenya
(2015) and (Erasmus, 2015) declare that identity theft costs the South African
economy over 1 billion rand a year, but Dirk (2015a); Mkheze (2015) reported
only a few months later that the same figure stands at 2 billion rand a year. The
conclusion however is that the South African economy, which is already suffering,
is losing a substantial amount of money to identity theft yearly.
2.1.6 Discovering you are a victim
Many victims learn that their identities have been stolen when applying for credit.
It is a clear warning that one is a victim when a debt collector calls in terms of
an outstanding balance, which one has no record of (Dirk, 2015a). According
to Carol McLoughlin, the South African Fraud Prevention Services (SAFPS)
spokesperson, individuals only discover they are identity theft victims once they
are notified by credit bureaus that they have been blacklisted for not paying
accounts, which were probably opened without their consent (Dirk, 2015b). Re-
covering from such a crime is frequently worse than discovering it. Victims must
prove their innocence by verifying that transactions were not done by them, they
must be removed from being blacklisted and sometimes even change their identity
numbers (Erasmus, 2015).
2.1.7 Identity theft prevention
The Protection of Personal Information Act gives legal right to confidentiality and
individuals should be aware that unauthorised admission to information regard-
ing a person’s education, medical records, financial statements, criminal records,
personal information or employment history is prohibited (SABC, 2015). It is
10
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therefore important that individuals know their right to privacy and make it
their own responsibility to guard their personal information. Recommendations
seen as good practice by Dirk (2015b) include the following: never give a pass-
word or personal identification number (PIN) telephonically, by email or via fax;
do not transport redundant personal information in wallets or purses; avoid doing
private banking by using internet cafes or insecure terminals; guard documents
containing personal information and be sure to destroy them when these papers
are not needed anymore; and regularly check accounts and credit records to notice
when strange transactions are made.
There are systems and strategies that have been implemented by authorities to
prevent crimes such as identity theft. The following systems and strategies are
available in South Africa:
1. Home Affairs established that official identity documents have a coat-of-
arms that is tactically positioned as an overlay to distinguish real documents
from fake ones (Makhubu, 2015).
2. The Department of Home Affairs upgraded their application process for
identity documents from manually to online (Dirk, 2015a).
3. Estate agents must be registered with the Estate Agency Affairs Board and
have a valid fidelity fund certificate (Maluleke & Pheko, 2015).
4. Social media accounts like Facebook have optional security settings that
limit the group of people who can view your profile (IOL, 2015).
5. Security officer certificates expire every 18 months and security business
certificates expire every 12 months to ensure that information is legitimate
(Mkhabela, 2015).
6. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 28 of 2001 was introduced to safe-
guard bank customers (SAPA, 2015).
7. Certain bank branches, for example Capitec, have installed biometric tech-
nology to increase client security (Alfreds, 2015a).
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2.2 Social media
Before the internet existed, personal information was far more difficult to collect
and associate with individuals. Reyns & Henson (2015) determined that the post-
ing of personal information online is a substantial predictor of identity theft. The
following section therefore discusses the internet and social media, the benefits
and risks thereof and online sharing of personal data.
2.2.1 The internet and social media
In the last decade, with the development of various electronic devices, internet
usage has increased exponentially (Henson et al., 2013). The internet has pro-
duced a completely new set of fraudulent practices, which include click fraud,
email spam, phishing schemes and identity theft (Becker et al., 2010). Internet
usage only became universally popular in the 1990s and therefore literature on
the fear of online crimes is scarce up until then (Henson et al., 2013). Today,
however, the fear of online crime is vital for investigation.
A big contributor to the data available on the internet is the expansion of
social media. Social media began with bulletin board systems years ago, but is
commonly known today with the growth of platforms such as Facebook, Twitter
and LinkedIn (Gaff, 2014). According to Hamed Haddadi (2010), in 2010 statis-
tical results showed that two out of three people in the United States and the
United Kingdom were members of at least one social media platform. Today it
has become the norm and almost everyone who has access to the internet joins
one or more social media platforms.
2.2.2 Definition of social media
Social media is defined as internet-based platforms for people to meet in virtual
communities and share information (Gaff, 2014). Social media includes platforms
such as blogs, social networking sites (e.g., Facebook), virtual social worlds (e.g.,
Second Life), collaborative projects (e.g., Wikipedia), content communities (e.g.,
YouTube) and virtual game worlds (e.g., World of Warcraft). For the purpose of
the study social media is defined as an online platform where users upload data to
12
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a personal profile that serves as a description of themselves when communicating
with other platform users.
2.2.3 Benefits and risks of social media
Social media platforms have the ability to share information widely and quickly.
This can be very valuable in companies or among communities when rapid de-
cisions or updates need to be broadcast. Social media platforms are used for
the marketing of products and services as well as communication with clients.
It is not limited to plain text files, but rather supports all types of information
including videos, images, website links and audio files. The medium is therefore
prodigious for advertising.
Social media platforms are an extraordinary contribution to the development
of communication technology. News reports on important events, governmental
decisions, public warnings, etc., are spread globally in seconds. Today it is pos-
sible to get in contact or keep contact with family and friends worldwide. Social
media even creates a potential to make new friends with platforms such as dating
websites. Job-hunting is simplified with platforms like LinkedIn where individuals
and companies load their professional information, successes and requests. The
communication of information is endless and above all, at an affordable price.
The downside to the broad and speedy sharing of data, is that it is possible
to spread harmful or incorrect information in the same manner. Negative pub-
licity on social media can damage a company’s reputation or brand. Destructive
information about individuals or cyber bullying can lead to serious consequences
like depression. It is important to acknowledge that the hacking of an account is
a likelihood. Hacking not only leads to the spreading of phoney information, but
also to more advanced complications such as identity theft.
2.2.4 Online sharing of personal data
Social media has made individuals more vulnerable to cybercrime. Facebook
is one of the world’s biggest social media networks. In March 2013 Facebook
launched a new feature, namely the graph search. Graph search is based on
semantics and enables users to search for questions written in natural language.
13
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The technique has made it possible to acquire personal information effortlessly.
By simply writing a query like “all single ladies, aged 22, who live in Cape
Town”, the graph search will crawl Facebook and return all individuals satisfying
the question (Khan, 2013).
Companies and individuals should have strict policies as to what and how
information is presented on social media. The sharing of personal data, on social
media platforms, is facilitated due to the minimum bar set by the terms and
conditions of these platforms (Gaff, 2014). A study done by Reyns & Henson
(2015) concluded that the posting of personal data online is a major predictor
of identity theft. The problem with social media platforms is that the design-
ers of the platform take copyright over the information that has been uploaded
(Hamed Haddadi, 2010). Once users quit the social network, their personal in-
formation is not necessarily deleted, but rather remains part of the platform’s
data.
Sophos, a security company, did a test on Facebook users to determine their
na¨ıvety. The company created a fake profile with the name of ‘Freddi Staur’
and sent out 200 friend requests to random people, of which 87 were accepted.
Results showed that 82 out of the 87 accounts shared personal information like
email addresses, physical addresses, dates of birth and employment information
(Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009).
It is important to recognise that users themselves determine the vulnerability
of the their personal information on social media platforms. Security and privacy
settings are available, but they do not guarantee protection from cybercrimes
(Patsakis et al., 2014).
2.3 Big data
It is known that social media is a great contributor to the phenomenon of big
data. This section gives a background to what big data is. It describes the
benefits and challenges of the field and provides examples of where it has been
applied.
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2.3.1 The analytics timeline
The idea to use data to guide decision-making is an early concept which was al-
ready in use in the 1950s. Due to technology innovation and the increase in data
velocity, volume, veracity and variety, an era of ‘business intelligence’ developed.
Information systems were built to organise data. Data was captured and busi-
ness intelligence technologies were used to query and report it. Data sets were
small enough that they were manageable in data warehouses. The processing
of data was very time-consuming and the minimum time was spent on analysis.
(Davenport, 2013)
In the mid-2000s, internet-based and social networks led to the era of big
data (Davenport, 2013). Data became too great in volume, velocity and variety
for it to be analysed on a single server. The rate at which data sets started
growing became so complex to process, that traditional database management
and processing applications were no longer able to handle the large amounts of
data (Lee et al., 2015). Therefore a need for more advanced tools and technologies
developed. It was found that the solution to the problem was the use of a network
that processes batch data across parallel servers. Hadoop is the most favoured
distributed processing core technology and will be discussed in Section 2.4 (Lee
et al., 2015).
The increased speed of data processing and data analysis has made it possible
to use information in decision-making, product creation and service development.
Davenport (2013) stated, ‘Today it is not just online and information firms that
can create products and services from analyses of data. It’s every firm in every
industry’.
2.3.2 Big data definition
There are several definitions for big data (Schneider, 2012). Boyd & Crawford
(2012) refer to big data as a ‘poor term’. The reason for this blunt statement
being that primarily the word ‘big’ in the term ‘big data’ accounts for the volume
of the data, but fails to grasp the remaining properties of the term. According
to Katal et al. (2013) big data implies the following properties:
15
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• Volume – The ‘big’ in ‘big data’ should actually be improved to something
like ‘massive’, ‘gigantic’ or ‘colossal’, because the existing data is measured
in zettabytes. The extent to which the volume of big data stretches is far be-
yond the limit that traditional systems can handle (McAfee & Brynjolfsson,
2012).
• Variety – Big data comprises several types of data including raw, structured,
semi–structured and even unstructured which is very complex to handle
with traditional systems (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012).
• Velocity – Big data is directly related to the speed of incoming data and
the speed of data flow. Data is continuously moving and this specifically
makes it impossible for traditional systems to keep up when it comes to the
analysis of big data (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012).
• Veracity – The quality of the data has improved immensely over the past
years.
• Variability – Aspects such as social media cause peaks in data masses. The
inconsistency of incoming data is an important feature of big data.
• Complexity – The cleaning, sorting, linking and analysis of big data requires
a difficult set of skills and entails advanced techniques and technologies
when handled.
• Value – Trends surface from filtered data and reliable information is captured
through queries. The use of big data creates incredible results and thus
adds value to businesses.
Big data is generated in real time or it is accumulated over time (He et al.,
2014). Companies gain an understanding of information that was not conceiv-
able before this era. Knowledge gained by the analysis of big data is measured
and directly interpreted into decision-making (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012).
Computerised decision-making is becoming a reality with the exponential growth
of data and the capabilities of the tools and techniques available (Elmegreen
& Sanchez, 2014). Computers will eventually take over the human component
16
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and make most decisions independently, based on data analysis. It is, however,
not smart to erase the need for human insight completely. Before a decision is
finalised, it should be well appraised by company leaders (Katal et al., 2013).
2.3.3 The benefits and challenges of big data
The greatest benefit of big data is that a department, company or industry can
make fact–based decisions on a daily basis (Ross et al., 2013). Big data has the
power to measure and manage data more effectively than ever before. Exception-
ally large data sets are used in analysis, which clearly increases the reliability of
results. Results are based on current data and not historical data, making an
organisation much more agile and giving it a competitive advantage (McAfee &
Brynjolfsson, 2012). Big data results in better predictions and decisions that are
more accurate. A variety of big data projects have been done in many different
fields. Table 2.2, extracted from Katal et al. (2013), lists a few of these projects
under their specific domains.
17
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Table 2.2: Previous Big Data Projects.
Domain Project Description
Science
Large Hydron Collider (worlds biggest and highest-energy particle
accelerator) – Data flow comprises 25 petabytes and extends to 200
petabytes after replication.
Sloan Digital Sky Survey (multi-filter imaging and spectroscopic redshift
survey) – Includes more than 140 terabytes of data and generates data at
200 gigabytes per night.
Government
Obama Administration Project – Involved 84 different big data programs.
Community Comprehensive National Cyber Security (for the delivery of
cyber security) – Data is stored in yottabytes.
Private
Sector
Amazon.com – Possess the three largest Linux databases in the world.
Capacities range from 7.8 terabytes to 24.7 terabytes.
Walmart – One million customer transactions are processed hourly and
more than 2.5 petabytes of data is stored.
Falcon Credit Card Fraud Detection System – There are more than 2.5
billion active accounts.
International
Development
Information and Communication Technologies for Development – Big data
adds to international development by producing fact-based decisions.
There are however many challenges concerning big data. The most significant
ones, according to Redman (2013) are:
• Data Quality – Up to 50% of employees’ time is wasted due to poor quality
data. A great amount of time is spent on data cleansing and specifically on
searching, identifying and correcting data errors.
• Data Credibility – Unreliable data causes managers to lose faith in the data
system and forces them to go back to their gut feelings and intuition rather
than hard decisions based on information.
• Privacy and Security – Personal information regarding users is collected by
invasion of their lives. Facts, desired to be kept secret, are collected from a
person without their consent.
Katal et al. (2013) agrees when Redman (2013) includes privacy and security
as a big data challenge, but argues that it is the most crucial issue. Data quality
18
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and credibility are included by Katal et al. (2013), under technical challenges,
but are not the only challenges addressed. The list of core issues according to
Katal et al. (2013) are:
• Privacy and Security – As Redman (2013) suggested, personal data, not
necessarily meant for anyone else except the user, is revealed and users are
uninformed about the fact that their data is being used to create insights.
• Data Access and Sharing – Due to organisations’ striving to have a com-
petitive advantage and culture of confidentiality, it is difficult to gain access
to certain client data and databases or to have a company agree to sharing
their data.
• Storage and Processing Challenges – The exceptionally large amount of
incoming data, produced by various sources, is too much to store and moves
so fast that it would be problematic to upload it in cloud, especially in real
time (Barbierato et al., 2014).
• Analytical Challenges – The fact that big data consists of raw, unstruc-
tured, structured and semi–structured data requires a need for advanced
analytical skills.
• Essential Skills – Due to the commercial use of big data being fairly new,
universities should offer programs to teach the wide range of skills needed
to process and analyse such data. Skills include not only technical and
analytical skills, but research, creativity and interpretive skills.
• Technical Challenges – Machines and software used for the processing of
big data are not 100% reliable or fault-proof. Complex algorithms are vital
for fault-tolerant computing. The scalability of big data makes it difficult
to know when data is sufficient, relevant or accurate enough to extract
conclusions from (Barbierato et al., 2014).
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2.3.4 The processing and analysis of big data
According to White (2009) the following tools and techniques are available for
the management of data:
• Hadoop and its Components – Hadoop, together with HDFS and MapRe-
duce, offer a trustworthy joint storage and analysis system. It entails various
projects that contribute to its distributed computing ability.
• High Performance Computing (HPC) and Grid Computing – Data is
distributed across a cluster with a combined file system hosted by a Stor-
age Area Network. The framework relies on Application Program Interface
(API) tools such as the Message Passing Interface to control data flow,
which becomes very difficult to manage.
• Volunteer Computing Technique – Work is broken down into portions and
shared among computers across the globe to be analysed and then returned.
This technique is hardware-intensive.
• Relational Database Management System (RDBMS) – RDBMSs are dif-
ferent in structure and means of analysis when paralleled to MapReduce.
Traditional databases only work with data sizes in range of gigabytes. Big
data requires databases to deal with data sizes in ranges of petabytes (Lee
et al., 2015).
Katal et al. (2013) compared the available techniques and found that Hadoop
is more user-friendly than HPC and Grid Computing because MapReduce auto-
matically does the tasks users have to control when using APIs. The Volunteer
Computing Technique is not as reliable as MapReduce due to the risk of computer
hardware failure. RDBMSs lack the ability to manage the size of big data and are
thus not suitable tools (Lee et al., 2015). It is therefore concluded that Hadoop,
combined with its components, is the best technique for the management of big
data.
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2.4 Hadoop
In the previous section, it was determined that Hadoop is the preferred technique
to manage big data. The following section explains the phenomenon, Hadoop. It
provides a brief introduction to Hadoop, what the framework consists of and how
it works.
2.4.1 What is Hadoop?
The velocity, volume and variety of big data leads to continuously growing un-
structured data files. No single record is predominantly valuable, but having
every single record is beyond valuable. The great extent of data created can be
of extreme worth, but the challenge remains that it must first be filtered, pro-
cessed and analysed. It is possible to perform such functions with a framework
like Hadoop. Hadoop has the ability to give meaning to an enormous amount of
insignificant random data (Lee et al., 2015).
Hadoop, founded by Doug Cutting and Michael Cafarella in 2005, is hosted
by Apache Software Foundation (Katal et al., 2013). Hadoop is an open-source
framework that offers shared storage and large-scale processing of data. The
storage is provided by the HDFS and the data processing by the programming
paradigm, MapReduce. Hadoop can store various types of data and execute
challenging data analysis (Lee et al., 2015). The framework’s ability to rapidly
process big data is due to the fact that batch data is distributed among parallel
servers as displayed in Figure 2.2 (Lee et al., 2015).
21
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.4 Hadoop
Figure 2.2: Distributed Data in Hadoop.
2.4.2 The Hadoop architecture
A typical Hadoop environment consists of a master node and slave nodes. It is
common to find more than one master node in an environment; this is to reduce
the risk of a single point of failure. The master node requires elements such as:
JobTracker; TaskTracker; and NameNode.
A Hadoop deployment includes several slave nodes. Slave nodes entail a
DataNode, which stores data in the HDFS and replicates data across clusters,
as well as a TaskTracker. Slave nodes provide a large amount of processing
power that has the ability to analyse hundreds of terabytes or even a petabyte of
data. The JobTracker element distributes MapReduce tasks to numerous nodes
within a cluster. The master node TaskTracker as well as the various slave node
TaskTrackers have the ability to receive the MapReduce tasks. The NameNode
element stores a directory tree of all the files in the HDFS and keeps an index
of where file data is stored among the DataNodes in the cluster. Figure 2.3 is a
graphical representation of the communication between the master node and the
slave nodes (Schneider, 2012).
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Figure 2.3: Hadoop Cluster.
The Hadoop distributed model is Linux-based and makes use of low-cost com-
puters. Therefore Hadoop was constructed to keep hardware failures in mind.
The framework saves three copies of each file by default and these files are spread
among different computers (Schneider, 2012).
2.4.3 The Hadoop infrastructure
The Hadoop architecture includes a set of tools generally known as projects.
The main subprojects are the HDFS and MapReduce, but the various other
subprojects each contribute to a specific area by providing it with higher–level
functionality and complementary services (White, 2009). Table 2.3 lists a few of
the essential projects according to Wayner (2015).
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Table 2.3: Hadoop Projects
Project
Name
Description
AVRO
Sequential system that packs data with a diagram to make it
comprehensible.
FLUME
Online analytical application that collects, aggregates and moves log
data.
GIS
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) that handle geographic queries
with the use of coordinates.
HIVE
Data warehouse infrastructure used for data summaries, queries and
analysis.
HBASE
Open source Java based project, which runs on top of HDFS, that
MapReduce jobs can run locally.
JENA
Project which supports the writing of applications that work on RDF
data.
LUCENE Tool that catalogues bulky blocks of unstructured text.
MAHOUT
Project that learns algorithms and provides recommendations
established on user’s taste.
NOSQL Data store with particular devices to store data across nodes.
OOZIE Project that schedules jobs in Hadoop system.
PIG High-level command project that is responsible for actual computation.
SQOOP
Tool that transforms bulk data between Hadoop and structured data
stores.
SQL
Traditional database query language adapted to support Hadoop in
quick, ad hoc queries.
SPARK Framework to support iterative algorithms.
The Hadoop framework is generally used to build recommendation systems,
searching tools, for online advertising, market analysis and even to sensor data
(Lee et al., 2015). The Hadoop framework is a data lake from which data can
be organised, queried, connected and made sense of. The Hadoop framework
contributes to the development of the semantic web.
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2.5 Semantic web
Hadoop serves as the perfect platform to make sense of an enormous amount of
data. Semantic web tools are applied to the Hadoop framework to add further
clarity to the data. The following section describes what the semantic web is and
the significance of connected data. It discusses applicable tools and techniques
and focuses on the Resource Description Framework.
2.5.1 What is the semantic web
The term ‘semantic web’ was invented by Tim Berners-Lee to describe the fu-
ture of the World Wide Web (WWW). Information is given expressive meaning
(semantics) in such a manner that computers can associate and understand the
connection between data from various sources (Mika, 2004).
The web consists of an enormous jumble of data that is very difficult to differ-
entiate if it is unknown how the data interconnects. WWW Consortium (W3C)
therefore developed the semantic web infrastructure to create some consensus
and eventually a dynamic web of data. The goal of the semantic web model is
to integrate data in such a manner that it is consistent throughout the web. If
data is connected and organised in a systematic way, more of the available smart
web applications will be able to extract the applicable information needed for
analysis, and consequently more value will be obtained from data (Allemang &
Hendler, 2011).
2.5.2 Semantic web tools and techniques
According to Allemang & Hendler (2011) there are a few general methods to
create integrated Web applications. Allemang & Hendler (2011) suggest the fol-
lowing two methods:
1. The first approach is to save data in a relational database. Then let queries
run against the database to build websites. If changes or updates need then
to be made to the data, they must be done in the database itself. Webpages
will then be consistent with information due to them extracting their data
from the same source, the mutual database.
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2. The second method is to write program code in some general-purpose lan-
guage like Java, Python or C. The code will connect data in different places
and in doing so keep them up to date with changes.
The goal of these approaches is to create an environment where websites are
not a collection of pages, but rather a collection of data. The interconnected
information can then be queried and presented as it is needed and websites will
have the ability to change dynamically as required (Allemang & Hendler, 2011).
2.5.3 Connected web of data
Currently the web offers a distributed network where web pages are universally
connected with links called Uniform Resource Locators (URLs). Websites that
are more refined use their own structure. They are backed up with a database or
Extensible Markup Language (XML) that guarantees that information remains
consistent. With the semantic web the desire is that the whole network follow the
structure where data items are interconnected with Uniform Resource Identifiers
(URIs) links. The connection of data items (URIs) replaces that of webpages
(URLs). The semantic web uses the Resource Description Framework (RDF) to
graph and present the connected web of the data (Allemang & Hendler, 2011).
2.5.4 Resource Description Framework
The Resource Description Framework is a data model that uses a general–purpose
language to present data in the web. A RDF is constructed with a set of triplets
that each contain a subject, predicate and object (Alkhateeb et al., 2012). The
subject and predicate of a triple entail URIs, and an object involves literal values
or blank nodes. Data is organised in graphs with edges and vertices as seen in
Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4: RDF Triple.
The prime use for RDFs is the integration of data. Figure 2.5 is a demon-
stration of how a relational database will look in RDF format. When RDFs are
compared to relational databases, it is found that RDFs are much easier recon-
structed to fit different types of queries. RDFs have been widely adopted by
companies because of their simple model. Examples of companies that are avail-
able in RDF format are Wikipedia’s RDF image called dbpedia and Facebook’s
format called Open Graph Protocol (Allemang & Hendler, 2011).
Figure 2.5: Adaption of a Relational Model to RDF.
2.6 Data mining
Rohanizadeha & Moghadam (2009) reported that data mining is frequently ex-
plained as the process by which technologies such as pattern recognition tech-
nologies and statistical and mathematical techniques are used to find trends and
relationships among variables in large amounts of data.
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2.6.1 Data mining models
According to Martins et al. (2016); Shafique & Qaiser (2014b), the three most
widely used data mining models are: Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD),
Sample, Explore, Modify, Model and Access (SEMMA) Methodology and the
Cross Industry Standard Process for Data Mining (CRISP). The three methods
are therefore discussed in the following sections.
2.6.1.1 Knowledge Discovery in Databases Model
The Knowledge Discovery Database (KDD) model is the process by which the
knowledge hidden in databases is obtained. The process is repetitious and inter-
active in nature. (Shafique & Qaiser, 2014a)
The nine phases of the model, presented in Figure 2.6 are described as follows:
1. Developing and Understanding of the Application Domain – cus-
tomer requirements are determined and transformed into goals.
2. Creating a Target Data Set – the required data set is created and
sampled.
3. Data Cleaning and Pre-processing – in this phase data is cleaned and
pre-processed to remove noise and inconsistencies.
4. Data Transformation – data transformation techniques are used to trans-
form data into a suitable format for model building.
5. Choosing the Suitable Data Mining Task – data mining tasks such as
classification, regression, clustering, etc. are identified.
6. Choosing the Suitable Data Mining Algorithm – data mining algo-
rithms that best suit the data set and objectives are selected.
7. Employing the Data Mining Algorithm – data mining algorithms are
applied.
8. Interpreting Mined Patterns – data mining algorithms are evaluated
and it is determined what they portray.
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9. Using Discovered Knowledge – knowledge gained is shared and applied
in practice.
Figure 2.6: KDD Process Cycle (Shafique & Qaiser, 2014a).
2.6.1.2 SEMMA Methodology
SEMMA is a data mining method that was first proposed by the SAS institute,
which is a leading company in the development of statistical software applications
(Rohanizadeha & Moghadam, 2009). According to Shafique & Qaiser (2014a),
the SEMMA cycle assists in the solving of business problems and the reaching of
business goals.
The acronym SEMMA stands for Sample, Explore, Modify, Model and Access,
which are the names of the five phases included in the cycle. The SEMMA Cycle’s
five phases are described as follows (Shafique & Qaiser, 2014a):
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1. Sample – a sample of data is removed from a large data set. The sample
must be large enough to produce significant information, but small enough
for rapid manipulation. This phase is optional.
2. Explore – explore data to determine trends and anomalies that exist in
the data.
3. Modify – determine outliers and screen data for variable removal. Modify
the data in order to simplify the model selection process.
4. Model – in this phase the data is modelled. Modelling techniques are
applied according to the data type and situation.
5. Access – evaluation of model performance and applicability of findings.
2.6.1.3 The Cross–Industry Standard Process Data Mining Model
The Cross–Industry Standard Process is used for data mining. CRISP was first
suggested in the 1990s by a European consortium of companies as a standard
process model for data mining. The model was non–proprietary at the time.
CRISP defines the steps of data mining and is relevant to any industry. The
model clarifies what must be done and contributes to the speed, reliability and
efficiency of projects Electronic Version: StatSoft (2013).
The CRISP Cycle has six phases as seen in Figure 2.7:
1. Business Understanding – define goals of project, define what data in-
dicates, construct possible questions, determine business objectives, create
a project plan and finalise hypothesies.
2. Data Understanding – collect all data, explore data using graphs or basic
statistics and determine what relationships exist in the data.
3. Data Preparation – clean data. Remember that this phase is very time-
consuming.
4. Modelling – apply the several predictive data models that are available.
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5. Evaluation – review models and determine which model or collection of
models satisfies or answers the business goals and objectives best.
6. Deployment – score new data with models.
Figure 2.7: CRISP Cycle (Electronic Version: StatSoft, 2013).
2.6.2 Data mining techniques
There are several techniques available in data mining. It is however, important
to note that only specific techniques are applicable to certain data types. Some of
the available techniques were summarised by Rohanizadeha & Moghadam (2009)
as:
1. Traditional Statistics – These techniques include cluster analysis, dis-
criminant analysis, logistic regression and time series forecasting (Han &
Kamber, 2001).
2. Induction and Decision Trees – Classification and Regression Trees
(CART), Chi–squared Automatic Interaction Detector (CHAID), Exhaus-
tive CHAID, Quick Unbiased Efficient Statistical Tree (QUEST), Random
Forest Regression and Classification and Boosted Tree Classifiers and Re-
gression are six of the different tree data mining methods investigated in
Sut & Simsek (2011).
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3. Neural Networks – According to West (2000), the multilayer perceptron
network is the most frequently used in literature.
4. Data Visualisation – In Soukup & Davidson (2002) there is a chapter on
data visualisation tools such as column and bar graphs, distribution and his-
togram graphs, box graphs, line graphs, scatter graphs, tree visualisations
and map visualisations.
2.6.3 Data mining functions
According to Han & Kamber (2001), the following data mining functions are
frequently required:
1. Description and Summarisation – is when the data is investigated to
determine certain characteristics . Techniques commonly used for this are
basic descriptive statistics and data visualisation tools (Rohanizadeha &
Moghadam, 2009).
2. Concept Description – is the process taken to describe and understand
data classes and to determine what the data represents. Techniques such as
clustering and induction are frequently used for this function (Rohanizadeha
& Moghadam, 2009).
3. Segmentation – is when data is sorted into groups according to similar
characteristics. Techniques fitted for this function are clustering, neural
networks and data visualisation (Rohanizadeha & Moghadam, 2009).
4. Classification – uses techniques such as discriminant analysis, induction
and decision trees, neural networks and genetic algorithms to group data
according to known classes (Rohanizadeha & Moghadam, 2009).
5. Prediction models – forecasts unexplored continuous data according to
a certain determined class. Techniques used to build these models include
neural networks, regression analysis, regression trees and genetic-algorithms
(Rohanizadeha & Moghadam, 2009).
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6. Dependency Analysis – determines the dependencies among data points
(Rohanizadeha & Moghadam, 2009). According to Han & Kamber (2001)
there are two essential dependency analysis techniques: association and
sequential patterns.
2.7 Literature review summary
The Literature Review discussed the topic of identity theft, the impact thereof on
South Africa, the different crime types, how offenders manage to acquire victims’
data, and how identity theft can be prevented. The study focuses on online
identity theft, specifically via social media platforms. Social media platforms
were therefore discussed, the benefits and risks thereof and the observed sharing
of personal information habits of individuals. Social media contributed to the
era of big data, which produced the next topic discussed. Big data was discussed
along with the popular big data analysis paradigm, Hadoop. The description
of the large amounts of data online led to the topic of the sematic web and
its preferred data model, the RDF. To make sense of all the data, data mining
is required. Information on data mining models, techniques and functions was
therefore collected and summarised as the final section of the Literature Review.
In the next chapter the required data will be determined and then collected.
A preliminary basic statistical analysis will then be done on the data to establish
if the data fits the study.
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Data Acquisition and
Preliminary Investigation
If you do not know how to ask the right question, you discover nothing.
- W. Edwards Deming
This chapter stipulates what data was needed to execute the research study,
the required data sources, the methods that were used to collect the information
and a preliminary investigation of the data.
3.1 Data required for research study
The purpose of the study was to identify the attributes that were commonly
observed in a historic data set of known identity theft victims, then to analyse the
social media information-sharing habits of a large group of people and determine
if there was a significant difference between the variables and habits of previous
identity theft victims compared to non–victims. The final goal of the research
study was to build a predictive model, which best classified identity theft victims
in order to determine if an individual was at risk of being an identity theft victim.
The following information was therefore required:
1. Information on recorded identity theft cases that included descriptive at-
tributes of the victims; and
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2. A data set that contained examples of personal data, including the related
variables found in the first set of data, that is publicly shared on social
media profiles.
The study was limited to South African identity theft cases and therefore the
data collected was that of South African citizens only.
3.2 Identification of data sources
In this section the data sources that were needed to obtain the necessary data
from, were identified.
3.2.1 Data source: historic identity theft cases
The first fundamental data collected was that of reported identity theft victims.
In South Africa identity theft incidents are reported to the South African Police
Service (SAPS) or the SAFPS). Hillcrest PI Rick Crouch said in Erasmus (2015)
that the SAPS is inadequate to handle identity theft types of crimes. Due to the
possibility of insufficient or incorrect information received from the SAPS, it was
decided to rather source the necessary data from the SAFPS. The SAFPS is the
top commercial reference in fraud prevention in South Africa (SAFPS, 2016).
3.2.2 Data source: social media sharing habits
The second set of information collected was on individuals’ personal information-
sharing activities on social media. The initial idea was to obtain this information
by crawling the relevant social media sites. Many social media platforms have
features where users can build applications, like Facebook’s Graph API, discussed
in Weaver & Tarjan (2013), to collect certain information from the site’s database.
The privacy policies of other social media platforms, such as LinkedIn, however
prevents this data collection method as it publicly states that it is illegal to crawl
the site. The privacy policies of the social media platforms discussed in this study
are summarised and included in Appendix A. The method of crawling to collect
the required information would therefore exclude certain social media platforms
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due to legislation. The study however focuses on social media platforms relevant
in South Africa. It is therefore important that all of the most popular social
media platforms in South Africa were incuded in the research.
MyBroadband (2015) discussed the results presented by We Are Social’s ‘Dig-
ital, Social, and Mobile in 2015’ report on South Africa’s most popular social
media platforms in 2015. Table 3.1 lists the social media platforms according to
the most popular, calculated by the percentage of the nation that is subscribed
to the platform.
Table 3.1: 2015’s Most Popular Social Media Sites in South Africa (MyBroad-
band, 2015).
Social Media Platform % of Nation Active Millions of users
WhatsApp 31% 16.74
Facebook 26% 14.04
Facebook Messenger 19% 10.26
Google+ 15% 8.1
Twitter 13% 7.02
LinkedIn 12% 6.48
Skype 11% 5.94
Pinterest 9% 4.86
Instagram 8% 4.32
WeChat 7% 3.78
It can thus be seen that the method of crawling is not feasible for the problem.
LinkedIn is one of the vital social media sites for investigation and would have to
be excluded if information was gathered via crawling.
It was decided to rather gather the data by making use of surveys. A study
conducted by Kaplowitz et al. (2004) concluded that if members of a population
all have internet access, online surveys are suggested as it was found that when
compared to hard copy questionnaires, online surveys achieve better response
rates. In Bryman et al. (2014) two types of online surveys were discussed; email
surveys and web-based surveys. Email surveys send a questionnaire directly to
potential participants via email. Web-based surveys present respondents with
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a link that directs them to a website with a questionnaire. According to Ilieva
et al. (2002), email surveys achieve a much better response rates than web-based
surveys.
The data was therefore collected with a survey that was sent via email to
the population of Stellenbosch University (SU). The SU population included all
students and staff members. The reasons for selecting the SU population were
the following:
• The more information gathered, the better the results. SU is a very large
academic institution with more than 30,000 students enrolled for 2016. This
yields a potential survey of 30,000 participants, excluding staff members.
• All individuals enrolled at the Stellenbosch University have access to comput-
ers and the internet. Therefore every individual has the opportunity to
subscribe to social media platforms.
• The minimum age requirements for social media platforms vary from 13 to 18
years (Bennett, 2014). It was decided that the target group for the surveys
will therefore be a group consisting of individuals with ages in the range of
18 to 80 years. The minimum age limit of 18 years was to ensure that no
social media site was excluded and the maximum age of 80 years is due to the
fact that most individuals are retired at that age. The identified population
of Stellenbosch University caters for the determined target group.
• The research study is done in South Africa and is based on South African
identity theft cases. The population is therefore applicable, because SU is
located in South Africa.
• Tertiary educated people are assumed to be intelligent and are therefore ex-
pected to be cautious on social media. The population would therefore test
the actions of wise people. The results on an uneducated population would
be expected to be much less cautious.
• A drawback of the population is that the majority of the population are young
people. The staff members, who are generally older, consist of a much
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smaller proportion. It was however decided that the population is still
valid, because the majority of social media users are younger people.
3.3 Data collection methods
This section describes how permission was granted to acquire the required data
and how the data collection process commenced.
3.3.1 Data collection: SAFPS
In order to obtain ethical clearances and receive information from the SAFPS a
proposal was constructed. The proposal explained how the data will contribute
to the research study and it specified how the data will be processed and pre-
sented. The SAFPS accepted the research study proposal and agreed to share the
indicated information needed for the research. It was agreed that the information
of the various identity theft victims were to be kept confidential. Therefore only
general, depersonalized information that could not be tracked to the victims was
received. The information included the age, gender, marital status and income
of all identity theft incidents reported in the year 2015. No data was connected
to victims’ personal identification.
3.3.2 Data collection: email survey
The second set of data was collected via a survey that was directly emailed to
individuals from the population group Stellenbosch University. The researcher
had to follow the Stellenbosch University’s ethics clearance protocol. The data
acquisition only began after institutional permission was received and the Faculty
Ethics Screening Committee classified the research study as a low-risk study. The
introduction of the survey was of such nature that potential participants first
needed to read the purpose of the study and then give consent to participate in
the survey as illustrated in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Survey Page One, Consent Question.
The first part of the survey asked participants to select the social media plat-
forms that they were subscribed to. It was then required of them to provide the
personal attributes which they publicly shared on these various sites. Before the
survey could be created, it was essential to first determine the social media sites
and attributes that were to be included in the survey.
It was decided to include the social media platforms that were most pop-
ular in the country at the time. The sites listed in Table 3.1 were the most
recent statistics for social media platform subscriptions. For the purpose of the
study, as recalled from the Literature Review Chapter, social media was defined
as an online platform where users can upload data to a personal profile that
serves as a description of themselves when communicating and sharing infor-
mation with other platform users. Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, Instagram and
Pinterest were therefore included in the survey. WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger,
Google+, Skype and WeChat were according to this definition not seen as social
media platforms as they are mainly communication mediums and were therefore
excluded from the research.
It was decided to include Mxit, as it is a South African developed social
media platform and YouTube, because Stellenbosch University students have free
access to the platform via the SU’s intranet. Dawid Jacobs, Independent Identity
Verification expert, stated that recently, more people have become identity theft
victims through dating websites (Alfreds, 2015b). Dating sites, which refers to
all dating platforms as a whole, were therefore the final platform included in the
survey.
The social media platforms that were included in the survey are presented in
Table 3.2 along with the feedback categories the survey would yield.
39
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.3 Data collection methods
Table 3.2: Survey Page Two, Part One, Platform Subscription Numbers.
Social Media Subscription Numbers
Social media platforms: Subscribed:
Facebook Yes = 1 No = 0
LinkedIn Yes = 1 No = 0
Twitter Yes = 1 No = 0
Instagram Yes = 1 No = 0
YouTube Yes = 1 No = 0
Pinterest Yes = 1 No = 0
Mxit Yes = 1 No = 0
Dating Sites Yes = 1 No = 0
Other Yes = ”Specify” No = 0
The second part of the survey requested participants to specify what attributes
from the list in Table 3.3 they have shared on which of the afore-mentioned social
media sites. The 15 attributes, incorporated in the survey, were determined after
investigating:
1. the privacy policies of the included social media sites that are summarised
in Appendix A;
2. the personal profile options provided by the different social media sites; and
3. the minimum information these sites requested to create social media ac-
counts.
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Table 3.3: Survey Page Two, Part Two, Shared Attributes.
Attributes of participants
that are revealed on
social media platforms
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
No Platform Facebook LinkedIn Twitter Instagram YouTube Pinterest Mxit Dating Sites Other
X1 Name
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X2 Surname
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X3
Identity number (pictures of an
ID doc, etc.)
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X4 Birthday (day, month and year)
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X5 Gender
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X6 Race
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X7 Physical address
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X8 Email address
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X9 Cell number
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X10 Relationship status
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X11 School details
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X12 University/College details
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X13 Job details
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X14 Income
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
X15 Credit card details
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
Yes = 1,
No = 0
The information gathered in the third and final part of the survey is presented
in Table 3.4. Participants had to provide their age, gender, relationship status
and monthly income. These attributes were requested because they were the
attributes that were captured and received from the SAFPS victim cases. The
attributes were therefore necessary to compare the two data sets. Participants
were then asked to state whether they had been a victim of identity theft or not. If
they answered ‘Yes’ to the question they had to select which type of identity theft
crime they were a victim of, where they could select one or multiple answers from
a given list. After investigating several identity theft crime cases in the Literature
Review, the most common crime types boiled down to the following options:
1. Existing Account Fraud (credit or debit card fraud);
2. New Account Creation (apply for credit cards, mortgages, phone service,
rent an apartment, buy or lease a car, etc.);
3. Tax Identity Theft (file fraudulent tax returns);
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4. Criminal Impersonation (offender using a person’s identity to hide theirs);
and
5. Other (type not mentioned above).
Table 3.4 shows the crime type options survey participants could choose from
if they had been identity theft victims and how the responses were recorded.
Table 3.4: Survey Page Three, Personal Details.
Attributes Possible Survey Responses
Age
Numerical value between
18 - 100
Gender options:
Male
Yes = 1, No = 0
Female
Yes = 1, No = 0
Relationship status options:
Married
Yes = 1, No = 0
Divorced
Yes = 1, No = 0
Single
Yes = 1, No = 0
In a relationship
Yes = 1, No = 0
No status
Yes = 1, No = 0
Monthly income Numerical value
Identity theft victim options: No = 0
Yes -
Existing Account
Fraud = 1
Yes -
New Account
Creation = 2
Yes -
Tax Identity
Theft = 3
Yes -
Criminal
Impersonation = 4
Yes -
Other = 5
According to a study done by Wiley et al. (2009), there are three effective
methods to encourage internet-based survey responses: survey follow-ups, pre-
notification of the survey and incentives. In order to encourage individuals to
participate in the survey an incentive of three prizes, worth R1 000 each, were
therefore arranged to be given away to three participants via a lucky draw. Par-
ticipants who wished to compete in the lucky draw, had to provide their email
addresses. When the option ‘Yes’, to compete in the lucky draw, was selected
in the survey, a secondary survey commenced that retrieved the email address of
the respondent and included it in a database from which the lucky draw winners
were chosen in a depersonalised manner. This was done to keep email addresses
anonymous and to satisfy the privacy controls requested by the Research Ethical
Council of SU.
The functioning of the survey was first tested with a pilot test that was sent to
a group consisting of 11 family members and friends. After careful consideration
and a few alterations to the design of the survey, the survey was sent out in May
2016 to 35,808 Stellenbosch University members falling into the groups: staff
members, postgraduates, undergraduates except first and final years, final years,
and first years. The surveys were sent out in batch groups to streamline the
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process and to avoid overloading the server. Participants were allowed two weeks
to respond to the survey.
The survey had a 12% response rate. Out of the 4 336 respondents, 16 did
not give consent for their information to be used for research purposes, and these
were therefore removed from the data set. This meant that 4 320 viable responses
remained. A total number of 4 124 participants competed in the lucky draw. The
three prizes were arranged after the survey deadline and the winners had to collect
them from the SU Industrial Engineering Department. All three of the winners
cashed in on the opportunity within a week’s time.
3.4 Revised research methodology
The original research methodology proposed the use of HDFS for the storing
of the data and the Hadoop programming paradigm, MapReduce, together with
RDFs for the analysis of the data. This approach would have been feasible if data
shared on social media was collected via the method of crawling. Data would then
be in URI format, which is required to build RDFs and the volume, variety and
velocity of the data would then have qualified as big data, which makes Hadoop
and its projects like Jena appropriate.
Owing to legal restrictions, the method of crawling caused the exclusion of
certain vital social media platforms. It was therefore decided to collect data on
the SU population’s social media sharing habits via an email survey. The survey
generated a total number of 4 320 responses. The survey retrieved 171 variables
per response, which means that 738 720 data points had to be analysed. A data
set of this volume can be processed by traditional data applications and does not
qualify as big data. The original research approach was therefore not applicable
as data was not in URI format and big data techniques were not necessary.
The revised research methodology is therefore to continue the study as initially
planned, but to adapt the data analysis techniques. It is proposed that data is
stored on a local secure drive rather than the HDFS and sorted with traditional
data processing tools such as Excel and not with RDFs and MapReduce. Instead
of SPARQL, traditional data mining with software such as Statistica will then
commence.
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3.5 Preliminary investigation of collected data
The data received from the SAFPS and the data collected via the email surveys
are examined in this section to gain perspective.
3.5.1 Preliminary investigation: SAFPS data
The information received from the SAFPS was cleaned and sorted in Excel. The
data was then imported into Statistica. The total number of feasible incidents was
2,039. Graphs were drawn to display the results on the different variables received
per incident: Age, Gender, Relationship Status and Income. As shown in
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.4 the results received on the variables Age and Gender
complied with that found by Erasmus (2015) and Dirk (2015b), which stated that
males between the ages of 28 and 40 were prime targets for identity theft.
Figure 3.2: SAFPS Data: Histogram of Variable Age.
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Figure 3.3: SAFPS Data: Box Plot of Variable Age.
The SAFPS data shows that 69% of the incidents reported were male victims
compared to only 31% being female and 45.5% of the victims were between the
ages of 30 and 40 years. The Box Plot in Figure 3.3 of the variable Age illustrates
that the most frequent age among the victims was 34 years.
Figure 3.4: SAFPS Data: Histogram of Variable Gender.
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The results on the variables Relationship Status and Income are presented
in Figure 3.6 and Figure 3.5. Figure 3.5 shows that 96% of victims stated that
they have no income and according to Figure 3.6, 77%, which was the majority
of victims, did not reveal their relationship status. The results on both these
variables are considered as poor answers, which can either be due to insufficient
data, the fact that victims wanted to keep this data confidential or random chance.
Figure 3.5: SAFPS Data: Histogram of Variable Income.
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Figure 3.6: SAFPS Data: Histogram of Variable Relationship Status.
It can be concluded that the variables Gender and Age may possibly have a
significant influence on the data set and can be expected to be predictor variables
of identity theft in the predictive model built for the research study.
3.5.2 Preliminary investigation: email survey data
The survey data was exported from the SU server into Excel. The responses were
in the survey designed format, mostly binary, as described in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and
3.4. The total number of feasible responses was 4 320 and the total number of
variables per response was 165, which contained 10 platform subscription vari-
ables Y j, where j = 1, 2, . . . 10, according to the platforms demonstrated in Table
3.5, 150 shared attributes among the various platforms variables as presented in
Table 3.5 and finally the variables Age, Gender, Income, Relationship Status
and Victim.
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Table 3.5: Variables for Attributes shared on Social Media Platforms.
150 Variables
Platform Revealed On
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Attribute Revealed None Facebook LinkedIn Twitter Instagram Youtube Pinterest Mxit Dating Sites Other
X1 Name X1Y1 X1Y2 X1Y3 X1Y4 X1Y5 X1Y6 X1Y7 X1Y8 X1Y9 X1Y10
X2 Surname X2Y1 X2Y2 X2Y3 X2Y4 X2Y5 X2Y6 X2Y7 X2Y8 X2Y9 X2Y10
X3 Identity number X3Y1 X3Y2 X3Y3 X3Y4 X3Y5 X3Y6 X3Y7 X3Y8 X3Y9 X3Y10
X4 Birthday X4Y1 X4Y2 X4Y3 X4Y4 X4Y5 X4Y6 X4Y7 X4Y8 X4Y9 X4Y10
X5 Gender X5Y1 X5Y2 X5Y3 X5Y4 X5Y5 X5Y6 X5Y7 X5Y8 X5Y9 X5Y10
X6 Race X6Y1 X6Y2 X6Y3 X6Y4 X6Y5 X6Y6 X6Y7 X6Y8 X6Y9 X6Y10
X7 Physical address X7Y1 X7Y2 X7Y3 X7Y4 X7Y5 X7Y6 X7Y7 X7Y8 X7Y9 X7Y10
X8 Email address X8Y1 X8Y2 X8Y3 X8Y4 X8Y5 X8Y6 X8Y7 X8Y8 X8Y9 X8Y10
X9 Cell number X9Y1 X9Y2 X9Y3 X9Y4 X9Y5 X9Y6 X9Y7 X9Y8 X9Y9 X9Y10
X10 Relationship status X10Y1 X10Y2 X10Y3 X10Y4 X10Y5 X10Y6 X10Y7 X10Y8 X10Y9 X10Y10
X11 School details X11Y1 X11Y2 X11Y3 X11Y4 X11Y5 X11Y6 X11Y7 X11Y8 X11Y9 X11Y10
X12 University/College details X12Y1 X12Y2 X12Y3 X12Y4 X12Y5 X12Y6 X12Y7 X12Y8 X12Y9 X12Y10
X13 Job details X13Y1 X13Y2 X13Y3 X13Y4 X13Y5 X13Y6 X13Y7 X13Y8 X13Y9 X13Y10
X14 Income X14Y1 X14Y2 X14Y3 X14Y4 X14Y5 X14Y6 X14Y7 X14Y8 X14Y9 X14Y10
X15 Credit card details X15Y1 X15Y2 X15Y3 X15Y4 X15Y5 X15Y6 X15Y7 X15Y8 X15Y9 X15Y10
The goal of this section was to study the survey results in order to see what
the nature of the data was and to determine if the effort of building predictive
models with the data would be worth it. In order to gain some perspective on the
data, it was decided that an average vulnerability score would be calculated per
respondent according to what attributes they have shared on how many social
media platforms.
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Table 3.6: Attribute Risk Factors for Vulnerability Score Calculation.
Risk Factor R Degree of Sensitivity Attributes
5
Offenders can commit various types of
identity theft fraud with
this information.
Identity number (X3),
Physical address (X7)
4
This is highly sensitive information,
but crimes are limited
and easy to stop.
Credit card details (X15)
3
Personal details that reveal an
individuals’ reputation and therefore
makes them targets.
Birthday (X4), Gender (X5),
Relationship Status (X10),
Income (X14)
2
Data that is often known publicly
and used in combination with other
details for crimes such as impersonation.
Name (X1), Surname (X2),
Race (X6), School Details (X11),
University/College Details (X12),
Job Details (X13)
1
Information that can contribute to
identity theft crimes, but is not
enough solely to commit a crime.
Email
Physical Address (X8),
Cell Number (X9)
In furtherance of the vulnerability score calculation, it was decided to assign
a risk factor to each attribute shared, according to its degree of sensitivity. Table
3.6 lists the attributes with their degree of sensitivity and respective risk factors.
Risk factors were not assigned to the specific social media platforms the attributes
were shared on. The purpose of the research study is not to discriminate between
social media platforms’ privacy settings. All of the included social media plat-
forms were therefore assigned equal risks of one.
The vulnerability factor per attribute was therefore calculated with:
V (Xi) = 0, when j = 1,
and
V (Xi) = R(Xi)
10∑
j=2
XiY j
where
i = 1, 2, . . . 15.
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The average vulnerability VA score could then be calculated per response case
with
VA =
∑15
i=1 V Xi
15
.
The maximum average vulnerability score possible is therefore 24 and would
be received if an individual happened to share all 15 attributes on all of the nine
social media platforms and the highest possible vulnerability score per single
social media platform is 2.67. Figure 3.7 displays the number of responses and
the average vulnerability scores per age groups: below 20 years, 20–30 years,
30–40 years, 40–50 years, 50–60 years, 60–70 years, 70–80 years, 80–90 years and
90–100 years. It is seen that the age group 30–40 years revealed the highest
average vulnerability score of 2.85.
It must be noted that the average vulnerability score gradually increased
from the age group below 20 years to the group 30–40 years and then gradually
decreased to the group 50–60 years. The lower scores for the younger generation
could perhaps be explained by the fact that they grew up with technology and
social media and are therefore more streetwise, as well as the fact that they
are still in the initial stages of their careers and not financially established yet.
The peak score generation of 30–40 years probably use social media as society
expects it of them to adapt to the new technology era and the majority of them
are financially established. Then finally the decrease in average vulnerability for
the age groups thereafter is probably due to the cautious behaviour of the older
generation as they were not brought up with technology and are in general either
not comfortable with social media or not even using it.
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Figure 3.7: Email Survey Data: Histogram of Variable Age.
Figure 3.8 shows the number of responses and the average vulnerability scores
per gender groups: male and female. Male victims presented a higher average
vulnerability score of 2.68 compared to the 2.39 score among females.
The results for the variables Age and Gender come with no surprise as they
once again agree with the most popular age of 28–40 years among identity theft
victims and the much higher percentage of male victims compared to female
victims as reported by Erasmus (2015) and Dirk (2015b).
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Figure 3.8: Email Survey Data: Histogram of Variable Gender.
In Figure 3.9 the total number of responses and average vulnerability scores
are displayed according to the five relationship status options: ‘Single’, ‘Married’,
‘In a Relationship’, ‘Divorced’, and ‘No Status’. The status with the highest
average vulnerability score was ‘Married’ with a score of 2.62 and the lowest
score was of the variable ‘No Status’ with a score of 2.12.
Respondents could optionally provide their monthly income. A total number
of 1 247 income responses were retrieved. The average vulnerability scores were
calculated for these cases and are graphed in Figure 3.10 according to income
subsets of the received results. The results peaked at two income values, R350 000
and R650 000 per year with average vulnerability scores of 5 and 4 respectively.
The variable Income contained many missing values and therefore these results
are skewed and were not considered as noteworthy.
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Figure 3.9: Email Survey Data: Histogram of Variable Relationship Status.
Figure 3.10: Email Survey Data: Histogram of Variable Income.
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The final variable investigated was Victim. The results on this variable were
crucial, because the research study assumed that identity theft victims are less
cautious with the sharing of personal information on social media platforms com-
pared to non-victims. If the results therefore prove the opposite, the research
hypothesis will have to be rejected. When respondents selected that they have
been identity theft victims, they were given five types of identity theft to choose
from as described in Table 3.4. Due to a lack of significant responses it was de-
cided to combine the different types to a single ‘Yes’ answer for the question as
to whether they had been an identity theft victim. The derived average vulnera-
bility scores for the dependent variable Victim, graphed in Figure 3.11, however
presented the expected results. The average vulnerability score for previous iden-
tity theft victims was reasonably higher than non-victims with a score of 2.72
compared to 2.48 for non-victims.
Figure 3.11: Email Survey Data: Histogram of Variable Victim.
It can be concluded that the collected survey data displayed the expected
results and is therefore sufficient to develop a prediction model. The predic-
tion model was therefore a realistic objective for the research study. The vari-
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ables Gender and Age consistently presented significant results and were there-
fore strongly expected to be predictor variables of identity theft in the prediction
model developed in the next chapter.
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Data Mining
In this chapter, the data mining of the survey data commences. The content of the
chapter includes a brief introduction to Statistica and an overview and application
of the Cross-Industry Standard Process (CRISP), which was the chosen model
for the data mining process.
4.1 Introduction to Statistica
Before data mining commenced the researcher went for assistance at the Centre
for Statistical Consultation at Stellenbosch University. It was recommended to
use the software program Statistica.
The Statistica suite of analytics software products and solutions is the top
product provided by StatSoft, which is now part of Dell Software. According
to Dell (2016), Statistica offers the most inclusive collection of data analysis,
management, visualisation, and mining procedures in one software platform. Its
techniques are the most comprehensive range and include methods like predictive
modelling, clustering, classification and exploratory techniques. The program has
been in use for over two decades and has a good record with various accomplish-
ments. Its global user base of over one million users testifies that it is a known
and tested analytics platform (Dell, 2016).
An article by Thompson (2015) stated that Statistica received the 2015 Tech-
nology Innovation Award from Dresner Advisory Services and Dell Statistica was
recognised as a leader in Advanced and Predictive Analytics for 2015.
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It was therefore decided that Statistica was the program of choice. Stat-
Soft, Inc. presents a series of 35 tutorial videos that cover essential concepts,
processes and data mining techniques that are included in Statistica (Electronic
Version: StatSoft, 2013). The concepts, processes and data mining techniques
recommended in the series of videos, were used as guidelines for the data mining
process as they are built into the software and therefore most relevant.
4.2 Data mining overview
In this section the different types of data were investigated to assist with the
selection of the data mining model to use as guideline for the data mining process.
4.2.1 Data mining types
It was fundamental to first identify the types of data collected by the survey,
before the application of the data mining model and the determination of the
necessary data mining techniques could kick off. There are three main types of
data mining applications (Electronic Version: StatSoft, 2013):
1. Classification type problems – The variable of interest is categorical in
nature. The goals of classification problems are to find variables that are
strongly related to the variable of interest and to develop a predictive model
where a set of variables is used to classify the variable of interest.
2. Regression type problems – The variable of interest is continuous in
nature. The regression type problem is therefore not applicable to the data
used in this study and will not be elaborated on.
3. Clustering type problems – There is no traditional variable of interest
and data is sorted into clusters. The clustering type problem is therefore
again not relevant to the data used in this study and will not be discussed
in any further detail.
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The email survey asked members of the SU population to give consent that
their information could be used for research purposes. The responses of individu-
als who answered ‘Yes’ to giving consent were recorded and those who answered
‘No’ could not complete the survey. The second part of the survey was to deter-
mine the number of users per social media platform for all the various platforms
included in the survey and then to learn what attributes these users share on
which and how many platforms. These questions were constructed as checkboxes
that allowed participants to tick multiple boxes, but was restricted to a minimum
of one box per question. The final part of the survey requested the participant’s
age, which had a lower limit of 18 years and a higher limit of 100. The partic-
ipants were then requested to select one of the radio buttons concerning their
gender and their relationship status. Monthly income was an optional question.
The survey was designed in such a manner that only the variables Age and Income
were continuous variables. The question as to whether the survey participants
had been identity theft victims or not had six possible checkboxes they could
select. Participants were allowed to tick multiple boxes, but were once again
restricted to one answer and limited to five. The variable of interest in the data
set was whether the individual had been an identity theft victim or not. The
dependent variable resulted in a binary response.
It can be concluded that all the variables, except for Age and Income were
categorical in nature. The purpose of the research study was to determine the
predictor variables of the dependent variable Victim and to build a prediction
model to classify new cases according to the dependent variable. Due to the binary
dependent variable Victim and the purpose of the research, it was therefore clear
that the research problem was a classification type problem.
4.2.2 Identification of the data mining model
The following data mining models were discussed in the Literature Review: Knowl-
edge Discovery in Databases (KDD), SEMMA Methodology and the Cross In-
dustry Standard Process (CRISP). Shafique & Qaiser (2014b) did a comparative
study of the three different models and the comparison results that were found,
are summarised in Table 4.1. It is seen that the SEMMA model does not provide
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for the initial phase where objectives are determined or the final phase that scores
new data with the final model. It was therefore decided that SEMMA is not a
good fit for the research, because it does not satisfy the objective to classify new
data as high-risk or low-risk identity theft victims. The two remaining models,
KDD and CRISP, are very similar. After the consideration of both models, the
CRISP model was preferred. It covers the same information range as KDD, but
in fewer steps. The CRISP model was developed in 1996 and has been thoroughly
researched. The CRISP 1.0 version is published, complete and documented and
the model is well structured and illustrated (Shafique & Qaiser, 2014b).
Table 4.1: Comparison of the Data Mining Models: KDD, CRISP-DM and
SEMMA (Shafique & Qaiser, 2014b).
Data Mining Process Models KDD CRISP-DM SEMMA
Number of Steps 9 6 5
Name of Steps
Developing and
Understanding of
the Application
Business
Understanding
*
Creating a Target
Data Set
Data
Understanding
Sample
Data Cleaning and
Pre-processing
Explore
Data Transformation Data Preparation Modify
Choosing the suitable Data
Mining Task
Modelling Model
Choosing the suitable
Data Mining Algorithm
Employing Data
Mining
Algorithm
Interpreting
Mined Patterns
Evaluation Assessment
Using Discovered Knowledge Deployment *
4.3 Application of CRISP
The CRISP data mining model provides a systematic framework that guides the
data mining process with the model’s six phases. The phases were discussed in
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Section 2.6.1.3 in the Literature Review. These phases will now be applied in
this study and are subsequently described.
4.3.1 CRISP phase 1: Business understanding
The business understanding phase is to determine the goals of the project and to
clarify what outcomes are expected from the project.
4.3.1.1 CRISP objectives
The following objectives are essential for the data mining phase:
1. Determine the variables that best predict identity theft victims;
2. Find a predictive model that best classifies victims; and
3. Deploy the model to make decisions on whether or not a social media user
is at risk of becoming an identity theft victim or not.
The handling and execution of the above goals will determine the success of
the research study.
4.3.1.2 CRISP expected outcomes
The historic data that was received from the SAFPS was delegated to serve
as reference variables. The data was cleaned, sorted and analysed during the
preliminary investigation that is discussed in Section 3.5.1. The two variables
that significantly stood out were Age and Gender. It is therefore expected that
these two variables will be identified by prediction models as predictor variables
of identity theft victims.
4.3.2 CRISP phase 2: Data understanding
The data collected in Chapter 3 is explored graphically in order to screen variables
and determine possible predictor variables.
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4.3.2.1 Histograms of survey variable occurrences
Histograms were graphed for the number of occurrences of each of the 171 survey
variables in order to determine the variables that presented very low responses
and that could therefore be neglected.
The first variable, Consent, was obtained by the compulsory question in the
survey that is presented in Figure 3.1. Only 16 participants did not give consent
and were therefore removed from the data set, the remaining 4320 participants
were accepted as viable responses.
Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.9 illustrate the percentage of survey participants that
were subscribers and non-subscribers to the various social media platforms. Fig-
ure 4.1, Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 indicate that Facebook, Instagram and Youtube
are the most popular social media sites. Figure 4.7, which presents Mxit sub-
scribers, and Figure 4.8, which presents Dating Site subscribers, show low user
percentages.
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Figure 4.1: Facebook Subscription. Figure 4.2: LinkedIn Subscription.
Figure 4.3: Twitter Subscription. Figure 4.4: Instagram Subscription.
The category with the lowest percentage response rate was for the platform
Mxit with a 3% response rate for the category subscribers, which was a total of
137 responses. Mxit responses are therefore expected to be insufficient. For now
none of the platform variables should be considered to be excluded for further
analysis, but Mxit must be investigated more.
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Figure 4.5: YouTube Subscription. Figure 4.6: Pinterest Subscription.
Figure 4.7: Mxit Subscription.
Figure 4.8: Dating Sites Subscrip-
tion.
Figure 4.9: Other Subscription.
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The recording of the information sharing habits of social media users resulted
in 150 variables. The variables are listed in Table 3.5 and discussed in Section
3.5.2. The histograms of these 150 variables are included in Appendix B, section
B.1, and only the variables with noteworthy results are summarised in tables and
discussed in this chapter.
The five attributes, revealed on social media platforms, that stood out to be
quite meaningless due to very low responses were Identity Number, Physical
Address, Job Details, Income and Credit Card Details. As presented in
Table 4.2, 93% of the population specified that they have not revealed their
identity numbers on any social media platforms, 83% of the population indicated
that they have not disclosed their physical address on any social media platforms,
98% did not share their income and 98% never revealed their credit card details
on any platforms. Except for Facebook, where the physical address of 14% and
job details of 41% of the population were revealed and LinkedIn, where 27% of the
population displayed their job details, no other social media platform displayed
significant results concerning any of these attributes.
Table 4.2: Noteworthy Attributes.
% of population that
revealed Xi on Yj
Platform Revealed On
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Attribute Revealed None Facebook LinkedIn Twitter Instagram Youtube Pinterest Mxit Dating Sites Other
X3 Identity number 93% 4% 3% 1% 2% (73) 1% 0% 0% 0% 1%
X7 Physical address 83% 14% 4% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1%
X13 Job details 47% 41% 27% 2% (74) 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
X14 Income 98% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
X15 Credit card details 98% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Table 4.3 shows the attribute sharing responses for the social media platforms
‘Twitter’, ‘YouTube’, ‘Pinterest’, ‘Mxit’, ‘Dating Sites’, the option of other social
media platforms, ‘Other’ and the option of no social media platform, ‘None’, that
were investigated. These were the social media platforms that displayed attribute
responses that were noteworthy. ‘YouTube’, ‘Pinterest’, ‘Dating Sites’ and ‘Mxit’
were the only platforms that indicated low responses to the sharing of cellular
phone numbers. Mxit was the only platform that presented low percentages for
the sharing of every single attribute. This can be due to the major drop, of 6.3
million users, in the Mxit user base between 2013 and 2015 (MyBroadband, 2016).
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The platforms ‘Twitter’, ‘YouTube’, ‘Pinterest’, ‘Dating Sites’ and ‘Other’ pre-
sented very low response rates for the variables: Relationship Status, School
Details, Job Details, Income and Credit Card Details. The low responses
can be explained by the fact that these platforms, except for ‘Dating Sites’ that
normally require users’ relationship status, do not explicitly require these de-
tails. The same reason can be given for the low rate of responses to University
Details shared on ‘YouTube’, ‘Pinterest’, ‘Mxit’, ‘Dating Sites’ and ‘Other’ plat-
forms. All the platforms included in Table 4.3, except for the ‘None’ option, show
that users do not generally share their identity numbers and physical addresses
on these sites, which is very positive for South African online fraud prevention.
The option to select ‘None’, which means that the attribute is not revealed
on any platform displayed the following results:
• Almost the entire population has their name, surname, birthday and gender
revealed on some or other social media platform;
• An extremely small percentage of the population has shared their identity
number, physical address, income and credit card details on any social
media platforms;
• The majority of the population has their email address, relationship sta-
tus, school details and university/college details stated somewhere on social
media; and
• Approximately half of the population present their race, cellphone number
and job details on social media platforms.
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Table 4.3: Noteworthy Platforms.
% of population that
revealed Xi on Yj
Platform Revealed On
Y1 Y4 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Attribute Revealed None Twitter Youtube Pinterest Mxit Dating Sites Other
X1 Name 1% 39% 38% 29% 2% (94) 6% 10%
X2 Surname 2% (108) 34% 32% 24% 1% 2% (105) 7%
X3 Identity number 93% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1%
X4 Birthday 9% 13% 10% 4% 1% 2% (93) 3%
X5 Gender 4% 24% 16% 11% 2% (80) 6% 5%
X6 Race 56% 8% 5% 3% 0% 3% 2% (103)
X7 Physical address 83% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1%
X8 Email address 26% 16% 21% 10% 0% 1% 3%
X9 Cell number 50% 4% 2% (98) 1% 1% 1% 5%
X10 Relationship status 34% 2% (70) 1% 0% 1% 3% 1%
X11 School details 15% 2% (89) 1% 0% 0% 1% 1%
X12 University/college details 11% 3% 1% 0% 0% 2% (69) 1%
X13 Job details 47% 2% (74) 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
X14 Income 98% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
X15 Credit card details 98% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
The response numbers for the continuous variable Age are presented in Figure
4.10. According to Figure 4.10 the minimum age of respondents was 18 years,
which was due to the lower age limit of the survey and the maximum age was 77
years that is well within the target group of 18 to 80 years as described in Chapter
3. The average age of respondents was 25 years and the age that occurred most
frequently was 21 years. The great number of respondents between the ages of
18 and 25 years is explanatory to the chosen population of university students.
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Figure 4.10: Variation in Age of Respondents.
Figure 4.11 presents the percentages of male and female responses of the
variable Gender. The female responses outweighed the male responses with a
percentage of 59% compared to 41%.
Figure 4.11: Number of Male and Female Respondents.
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The Relationship Status variable occurrences among respondents are pre-
sented in Figure 4.12. The low percentages of divorced and married individuals
are probably related to the age range of the population illustrated in Figure 4.10.
Figure 4.12: Relationship Status Occurrences among Respondents.
The variable Income is graphed in Figure 4.13. Due to the lack of responses,
as observed by the graph that displays no significant results, the variable was
removed from the data set and no further analysis was done on the variable.
Figure 4.13: Income of Participants.
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Figure 4.14: Number of Victims and Non-Victims.
The dependable variable of interest is graphed in Figure 4.14. The survey
asked participants who indicated that they have been identity theft victims to
specify the type of identity theft they have been victims of. Due to no significant
results to a particular type, as seen in Appendix B, Figures B.151, B.152, B.153,
B.154 and B.155, it was decided to merge the different types of fraud to a single
answer, ‘Yes, I have been a victim’.
Of all respondents, 11% had previously been identity theft victims. The re-
sulting number of 467 victims out of the total population of 4 320 respondents
were enough occurrences to do analysis on. This was a crucial breaking point in
the research study.
4.3.2.2 Variable screening
In this section the variables that were graphically inspected with histograms in
the previous section, were screened.
According to Electronic Version: StatSoft (2013), the effect of too many vari-
ables is:
• The curse of Dimensionality: The more predictor variables included in a pre-
diction model, the more data points needed; and
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• Deployment (the scoring of new data with a trained prediction model) Com-
plexity: All variables included in the model are required when new data is
gathered for deployment. Deployment is therefore made less complex with
less input variables.
It is therefore important that all variables that are not related to the variable
of interest and which add no or little information to the outcome of the dependent
variable should be eliminated before modelling commences. It was decided that
variables with response numbers of less than 100, were to be excluded from the
data set.
The variable Consent was excluded, because it was insignificant to the anal-
ysis. The platform subscription variables presented in Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.9
displayed sufficient responses and all remained in the data set. Table 4.4 is a
summary table of all the attribute sharing variables’ response results.
The cut-off point for variable exclusion was 100, which is 2.31%. The per-
centages in the Tables are rounded values, which is why the number of responses
are indicated in brackets next to the variables with responses of 2%.
The variables with unsatisfactory response rates were discussed in the previ-
ous section. The remaining attribute sharing variables, after all variables with
response numbers less than 100, were removed, are listed in Table 4.5.
The variables Age and Gender, in Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11, portrayed sig-
nificant responses and were included in the data set for analysis. The relationship
status ‘Divorced’, graphed in Figure 4.12, had only 39 responses and was therefore
removed from the data set. The variable Income displayed inconsistent results,
as shown in Figure 4.13, because of a lack of responses and was excluded from the
data set. The different types of identity theft for the dependent variable, Victim,
were merged in the previous section, which resulted in a single variable instead
of six variables.
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Table 4.4: Summary of Variable Occurrences according to the Histograms’ Re-
sults.
% of population that
revealed Xi on Yj
Platform Revealed On
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Attribute Revealed None Facebook LinkedIn Twitter Instagram YouTube Pinterest Mxit Dating Sites Other
X1 Name 1% 93% 37% 39% 58% 38% 29% 2% (94) 6% 10%
X2 Surname 2% (108) 91% 36% 34% 51% 32% 24% 1% 2% (105) 7%
X3 Identity number 93% 4% 3% 1% 2% (73) 1% 0% 0% 0% 1%
X4 Birthday 9% 87% 21% 13% 12% 10% 4% 1% 2% (93) 3%
X5 Gender 400% 92% 30% 24% 32% 16% 11% 2% (80) 6% 5%
X6 Race 56% 39% 12% 8% 14% 5% 3% 0% 3% 2% (103)
X7 Physical address 83% 14% 4% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 1%
X8 Email address 26% 62% 27% 16% 16% 21% 10% 0% 1% 3%
X9 Cell number 50% 44% 10% 4% 4% 2% (98) 1% 1% 1% 5%
X10 Relationship status 34% 65% 3% 2% (70) 3% 1% 0% 1% 3% 1%
X11 School details 1500% 81% 24% 2% (89) 3% 1% 0% 0% 1% 1%
X12 University/college details 1100% 82% 28% 3% 7% 1% 0% 0% 2% (69) 1%
X13 Job details 47% 41% 27% 2% (74) 1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1%
X14 Income 98% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
X15 Credit card details 98% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Table 4.5: Variable Screening.
Screened Variables
Platform Revealed On
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 Y5 Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10
Attribute Revealed None Facebook LinkedIn Twitter Instagram Youtube Pinterest Mxit Dating Sites Other
X1 Name * X1Y2 X1Y3 X1Y4 X1Y5 X1Y6 X1Y7 * X1Y9 X1Y10
X2 Surname X2Y1 X2Y2 X2Y3 X2Y4 X2Y5 X2Y6 X2Y7 * X2Y9 X2Y10
X3 Identity number X3Y1 X3Y2 X3Y3 * * * * * * *
X4 Birthday X4Y1 X4Y2 X4Y3 X4Y4 X4Y5 X4Y6 X4Y7 * * X4Y10
X5 Gender X5Y1 X5Y2 X5Y3 X5Y4 X5Y5 X5Y6 X5Y7 * X5Y9 X5Y10
X6 Race X6Y1 X6Y2 X6Y3 X6Y4 X6Y5 X6Y6 X6Y7 * X6Y9 X6Y10
X7 Physical address X7Y1 X7Y2 X7Y3 * * * * * * *
X8 Email address X8Y1 X8Y2 X8Y3 X8Y4 X8Y5 X8Y6 X8Y7 * * X8Y10
X9 Cell number X9Y1 X9Y2 X9Y3 X9Y4 X9Y5 * * * * X9Y10
X10 Relationship status X10Y1 X10Y2 X10Y3 * X10Y5 * * * X10Y9 *
X11 School details X11Y1 X11Y2 X11Y3 * X11Y5 * * * * *
X12 University/College details X12Y1 X12Y2 X12Y3 X12Y4 X12Y5 * * * * *
X13 Job details X13Y1 X13Y2 X13Y3 * * * * * * *
X14 Income * * * * * * * * * *
X15 Credit card details * * * * * * * * * *
The final sum of variables consisted of the nine platform subscription variables,
80 out of the 150 attribute sharing variables, the variables Age, Gender and
Victim and the four remaining relationship status options variables. The final
number of variables that remained in the data set after the screening process was
therefore 96.
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4.3.2.3 Relationship histograms of survey variables
Histograms viewing the relationship between previous identity theft victims ver-
sus non-victims of the 96 remaining variables were constructed to identify possible
identity theft predictor variables.
In Figure 4.15 to Figure 4.23 the percentage of individuals who have been
identity theft victims compared to non-victims are graphed according to platform
subscribers and non-users for every social media platform included in the survey.
It is notable that LinkedIn in Figure 4.16, Mxit in Figure 4.21 and Dating Sites
in Figure 4.22 are the only social media platforms where subscribers have a higher
percentage of victims compared to non-users. These sites are therefore possible
predictor variables. It is noteworthy that the graph drawn for other social media
platforms in Figure 4.23 has exactly the same percentage of victims for users and
non-users and will possibly not have a significant influence on predictions.
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Figure 4.15: Facebook ID Victims.
Figure 4.16: LinkedIn ID Victims. Figure 4.17: Twitter ID Victims.
Figure 4.18: Instagram ID Victims. Figure 4.19: YouTube ID Victims.
Figure 4.20: Pinterest ID Victims. Figure 4.21: Mxit ID Victims.
Figure 4.22: Dating Sites ID Victims. Figure 4.23: Other ID Victims.
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Table 4.6 shows a summary of the relationship histogram results of the at-
tributes Identity Number, Physical Address, School Details and Job Details.
For each of these attributes the percentage victims of non-users and users are
listed as observed for the social media platforms ‘None’, ‘Facebook’ and ‘LinkedIn’.
These were the attributes that displayed significant results, because for the major-
ity of social media platforms that they were shared on, these attributes presented
a much higher victim percentage among users, when compared to non-users. The
only incidence that differed from the recurrent trend was: School Details on
Facebook. The platform option ‘None’ points to the fact that for the attributes
listed in Table 4.6, the victim percentage was much higher when shared on some
social media sites, compared to when not shared on any social media platform.
The variables in Table 4.6, except for School Details on Facebook, are therefore
possible predictor variables.
Table 4.6: Noteworthy Victim Relationships for Certain Attributes.
% victims (non-users)
— % victims (users)
Platform Revealed On
Y1 Y2 Y3
Attribute Revealed None Facebook LinkedIn
X3 Identity number 22%—10% 10%—19% 11%—18%
X7 Physical address 16%—10% 10%—14% 10%—19%
X11 School details 11%—10% 12%—10% 10%—14%
X13 Job details 13%—8% 10%—12% 9%—14%
In Table 4.7, the social media platforms that demonstrated notable results,
are listed along with the percentage of non-user victims versus user victims per
attribute shared on them. The no platform option, ‘None’, is a meaningful vari-
able, because the percentage of non-user victims represents the attributes shared
on some or other social media platform and the user victims percentage stands
for the attributes not shared on any social media platform. Keeping this in mind
it is conspicuous that the victim percentage for every single attribute, except
Birthday and Gender, is higher when shared on some type of social media plat-
form. The exceptions Birthday, which had equal percentages for non-user and
user victims, and Gender that shows a slightly higher victim percentage when not
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shared on social media, are both unusual occurrences. The SAFPS information,
used to determine the expected variables in the CRISP business understanding
phase, clearly foresees Age and Gender to be predictor variables. The only vari-
ables on ‘Facebook’ with higher user victim percentages than non-user victim
percentages were Identity Number, Physical Address and Job Details. Fur-
thermore, it seems that ‘Facebook’ users have lower victim percentages compared
to non-users. ‘LinkedIn’ and ‘Dating Sites’, however, testify to higher user victim
percentages than non-user victim percentages for every single attribute. Other
social media platforms not included in the survey could be added by partici-
pants under the name ‘Other’. These platforms revealed that the percentage
victims for the users of these platforms are higher than the percentage for non-
users for all attributes except Name, which had equal percentages. The possible
predictor variables resulting from Table 4.7 were therefore: Identity Number,
Physical Address and Job Details shared on ‘Facebook’; all the relevant at-
tributes shared on ‘LinkedIn’ and ‘Dating Sites’; all the attributes not shared on
any platform, except for Birthday and Gender and finally all the relevant at-
tributes shared on ‘Other’ platforms, excluding the attributes Name and Gender.
Table 4.7: Noteworthy Victim Relationships for Certain Platforms.
% victims (non-users)
— % victims (users)
Platform Revealed On
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y9 Y10
Attribute Revealed None Facebook LinkedIn Dating Sites Other
X1 Name * 17%—10% 9%—13% 11%—13% 11%—11%
X2 Surname 11%—7% 15%—10% 9%—13% 11%—12% 11%—13%
X3 Identity number 22%—10% 10%—19% 11%—18% * *
X4 Birthday 11%—11% 14%—10% 10%—14% * 11%—14%
X5 Gender 11%—13% 16%—10% 10%—13% 11%—13% 11%—11%
X6 Race 11%—10% 11%—10% 10%—13% 11%—16% 11%—15%
X7 Physical address 16%—10% 10%—14% 10%—19% * *
X8 Email address 11%—10% 11%—10% 10%—13% * 11%—16%
X9 Cell number 12%—10% 11%—11% 11%—12% * 11%—13%
X10 Relationship status 11%—10% 11%—11% 11%—15% 11%—16% *
X11 School details 11%—10% 13%—10% 10%—14% * *
X12 University/college details 11%—9% 14%—10% 10%—14% * *
X13 Job details 13%—8% 10%—12% 9%—14% * *
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Figure 4.24 displays the average age of victims and the average age of non-
victims. According to the expected variable information in the business under-
standing phase it is anticipated that the average age of victims is between 26 and
38 years. The results in Figure 4.24 support this expectation with the average age
of non-victims being 24.25 years and that of victims 27.85 years, which is much
closer to the anticipated age. It is strongly expected that Age is the greatest
predictor variable.
Figure 4.24: Variation in Age of Victims and Non-Victims.
The results received from the SAFPS in the business understanding phase
revealed that 69% of all the victims recorded were males. In Figure 4.25 the
percentage of male victims is 3% higher than the percentage of female victims.
The variable Gender is therefore firmly believed to be a predictor variable.
Figure 4.25: Number of Male and Female Victims and Non-Victims.
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Figure 4.26: Relationship Status Occurrences for Victims and Non-Victims.
Figure 4.26 displays victims and non-victims according to their relationship
status. The relationship status, ‘Married’, is by far the variable with the highest
victim percentage and is thus expected to be a predictor variable. This obser-
vation can possibly be connected to age, as Age is expected to be a predictor
variable and married people generally represent the older part of the population.
The remaining relationship statuses show more or less the same results.
4.3.2.4 Scatterplot of sensitivity against specificity
Considering all the variables above, Age stood out to be the predictor variable that
is expected to be the most influential and it was therefore decided to construct a
scatterplot of sensitivity against specificity of the variables Age and Victim.
Sensitivity is the probability to correctly identify an individual as a victim
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and specificity the probability to correctly identify the person as a non-victim.
Sensitivity and specificity are inversely proportional and the crux of the operation
is to determine the point that takes both sensitivity and specificity into account
and best benefits both.
In Figure 4.27 it is seen that the point in age that best fits sensitivity, at 0.39,
and specificity, at 0.55, is 23.5 years. It is therefore more likely for individuals
to be identified as victims when they are older than 23.5 years and non-victims
when younger.
Figure 4.27: Scatterplot for Variables Age and Victim.
4.3.3 CRISP phase 3: Data preparation
In this phase the final preparation of the data set is done by the handling of
outliers and missing data.
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4.3.3.1 Outlier identification
Outliers can be identified by either graphically viewing the data or by making
use of statistical tests. Box plots are typically used to present the outliers in
continuous data and histograms in categorical data.
The only continuous variable in the data set was Age. A box plot was con-
structed for this variable. As illustrated by Figure 4.28, the non-outlier range of
the variable Age is 18 to 34 years. The outliers and extremes are all greater than
34 years and are due to the small percentage of staff members in the population
that are generally older than the students. It was therefore decided to not remove
the outliers and extremes as they are not random.
Figure 4.28: Box Plot of Age.
The histograms presented in the data understanding phase were used to iden-
tify the outliers of the categorical variables. The categorical outliers were then
dealt with in Section 4.3.2.2. Except for Relationship Status that could take
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on one of five possible fixed values, all other variables were binary. The variables
that remained after the screening process were presented in Table 4.5.
4.3.3.2 Missing data
Most data mining algorithms do not consider the missing entries and simply ig-
nore them. This is problematic, because missing data frequently includes valuable
data on other variables. If the missing data points are simply ignored, it can cause
the loss of data and perhaps biased results. Statistica offers tools that substitutes
missing data. Substitution methods include the mean, median or specific value
method. The problem with substituting data is that there is a possibility that
these methods can falsely decrease variance, which can affect correlation. An-
other approach is to use the k-nearest neighbours method where the value, k, is
selected and then the k cases most similar to the missing data are used to replace
the blank spaces (Electronic Version: StatSoft, 2013).
The survey that was used to collect the data for the research project was
constructed in such a manner that participants could not proceed with the survey
if they did not complete the compulsory questions. This function made provision
for thorough answers and eliminated the risk of having missing data. No missing
data tools were therefore needed for any of the compulsory questions.
4.3.3.3 Other data problems
According to Electronic Version: StatSoft (2013) attention should be given to the
following additional problems:
• Sparse Data: Variables that consist of too many missing values. These vari-
ables are not valuable to a model due to the lack of observations. It does
not add tangible information and should therefore be removed.
In the survey sent to SU members, participants were optionally requested
to provide their monthly income. Due to the lack in responses the variable
Income was classified as sparse data and removed from the data set.
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• Invariant Data: Variables with little or no variability contribute nothing to a
model and are therefore not valuable to model building. Invariant variables
should be removed from data.
All participants were asked to give consent and without this permission
their responses were not viable and therefore not recorded. The remaining
responses all had identical values for the variable Consent. The variable
consent was thus identified as invariant data and removed from the data
set.
• Duplicate Records: Duplicate records will skew analysis. The influence mul-
tiple entries of the same record will have on a data set is not equal to the
actual weight of the record. Only one of these identical records should
remain in the data set; the rest must be removed.
The survey was constructed in such a manner that duplicate records were
not possible. Every participant could only submit the survey once.
4.3.4 CRISP phase 4: Modelling
In this section the modelling phase of the CRISP cycle took place. Various models
for classification type problems were applied to the research data.
4.3.4.1 Determination of models for classification of identity theft vic-
tims and non-victims
A classification type problem is when a certain case must be assigned to a pre-
ordained group based on the observed attributes of the case that are related to
the group. It was therefore decided to investigate the different techniques ap-
plicable to classification type problems, as the goal of this phase was to classify
individuals as identity theft victims or non-victims. In the Literature Review in
Chapter 2, it was found that techniques such as the discriminant analysis, in-
duction and decision trees, neural networks and genetic algorithms were used to
group data according to known classes (Rohanizadeha & Moghadam, 2009). In
order to determine which would be the best fit for the research study the following
techniques were therefore explored:
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1. Discriminant Analysis – studies the differences between two or more
groups, such as identity theft victims and non-victims in the case of this
study, with respect to numerous variables concurrently. The basic assump-
tions of this technique are that all data cases must belong to only one of
the two or more groups; there must be at least two cases per group; the
number of discriminant variables must not exceed the total number of cases
minus two; discriminant variables are not allowed to be linear combinations
of other discriminating variables and should be measured at the interval
level; covariance matrices for the various groups must be more or less equal
and finally all groups must be from a population with a normal distribution
on the discriminating variables. (Klecka, 1980)
2. Induction and Decision Trees – Decision trees are used to classify cases
according to certain classes. Decision trees have nodes that represent either
a class name or an attribute test that branches cases according to possible
test outcomes and then the divided subsets are solved further by each test
outcome with subtrees (Utgoff, 1989). Classification and regression tree
properties include the ability to process many different data types such as
numerical, categorical, censored, multivariate data and dissimilarity ma-
trices; complex problems are modelled easily; missing values are handled
without losing too much data; and trees are constant to monotonic trans-
formations of predictor variables (De’Ath, 2007).
3. Neural Networks – are according to Electronic Version: StatSoft (2013)
a non-parametric modelling tool that represents the function of biological
neurons to learn from data. The model uses weights and neurons to detect
complex relationships among variables and performs well with rough data.
Neural Networks are applicable to classification, regression, time series and
clustering tasks (Electronic Version: StatSoft, 2013). Elements or nodes
used in Neural Networks are typically nonlinear and analog and they do
not assume the shape of the underlying distributions as well as traditional
statistical classifiers (Lippmann, 1987).
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4. Genetic Algorithms – are part of the metaheuristic methods that model
natural evolution processes. It is used to solve complex engineering opti-
misation problems, which contain a large search space. Genetic Algorithms
evolve a population in a systematic manner in order to find the best solution
by making use of computational processes. (Bagchi, 1999)
It was seen that the data mining techniques that were applicable to the re-
search were the discriminant analysis; induction and decision trees; and neural
networks. Genetic algorithms are typically used for optimisation problems and
were therefore not relevant.
A study conducted on credit scoring was used to determine which of the three
remaining techniques was most applicable to the study. The study by Lin &
McClean (2001) used the following techniques to score 8 000 customers as ei-
ther good or bad credit customers: Discriminant Analysis, Logistic Regression,
Neural Networks, Classification and Regression Trees, and Multivariate Adaptive
Regression Splines (MARS). The dependent variable for the study was the credit
status of customers, which could either be good or bad, and the data set fur-
ther contained nine variables namely gender, age, marriage status, educational
level, occupation, job position, annual income, residential status and credit limits
(Lin & McClean, 2001). The study by Lin & McClean (2001) was similar to
this research as it consisted of the same objective to build a predictive model
that classified cases according to a categorical dependent variable. The meth-
ods used in the credit scoring study were therefore applicable in this study. Lin
& McClean (2001) concluded that the commonly used techniques like discrimi-
nant analysis and logistic regression were frequently dismissed due to their strict
model assumptions and neural networks due to its lengthy training process, in-
terpretative difficulties and the general struggle to determine the importance of
input variables. The analytical results showed that CART and MARS presented
better credit scoring accuracies and lower Type II errors than Discriminant Anal-
ysis, Logistic Regression, Neural Networks and Support Vector Machines (Lin &
McClean, 2001).
It was decided that the data mining technique best suited for the research
study was therefore decision trees as it included the CART method. The results
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founded by Lin & McClean (2001) eliminated Neural Networks and the Discrim-
inant Analysis. Decision trees will subsequently be discussed.
4.3.4.2 Different types of decision trees
Decision trees are predictive models used in data mining. Classification trees
are used for classification type problems and regression trees for regression type
problems. In this study the research problem is a classification task. Classification
trees classify a case (such as a survey response) into a predefined class (such as an
identity theft victim or non-victim) based on attributes (such as attributes shared
on social media) (Rokach & Maimon, 2015). Classification trees are widely used
in various fields like finance, marketing, health, engineering, education, etc.
The advantages of decision trees are that they are self-explanatory; they ac-
company both nominal and numeric input variables; they have the ability to
represent any discrete value; data sets that contain errors or missing values are
handled; and finally they are non-parametric models, which means there are no
assumptions on the space distribution or classifier structure. Disadvantages how-
ever include that the majority of models require discrete values for the target
variable; they perform best if a few very relevant variables exist opposed to many
complex ones; the over-sensitivity of the training set can cause instability; frag-
mentation problems may arise; and the handling of missing values is sometimes
a battle (Rokach & Maimon, 2015).
According to Rokach & Maimon (2015) some of the popular decision trees’
induction algorithms are ID3, C4.5, CART, CHAID and QUEST. CHAID per-
forms well with survey data, because of the data’s categorical nature (Electronic
Version: StatSoft, 2013). In an ecological analysis study done by De’Ath (2007)
it was found that boosted trees were more interpretable than neural networks.
The technique demonstrated the correlations between predictors very well and
was found to be an excellent prediction model (De’Ath, 2007). The results from
a study conducted by Rodriguez-Galiano et al. (2012) on land-cover classifica-
tion concluded that the Random Forest model outperformed simple decision tree
models as it amplified variation between the diverse categories of the research
area.
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It was therefore decided that the models; CART, CHAID, Random Forest
and Boosted Trees were most applicable to the research study’s data type and
testified to good performance in previous studies. These trees were ideal as they
are included in the Statistica tree building tools (Electronic Version: StatSoft,
2013). These trees are now applied and described in their own subsections.
4.3.4.3 Survey data sampling for model building
The data that was prepared in the data preparation phase of the CRISP cycle, was
sampled before it was used for model building. Data was randomly divided into
two samples; a 70% training sample and a 30% testing sample. Data sampling is
necessary for the validation phase of the CRISP cycle and it is a safeguard against
overfitting (Electronic Version: StatSoft, 2013). The training sample of data is
used to construct the models and to identify patterns and the testing sample of
data measures the performance of the model relative to the training data.
It was decided to use stratified random sampling, because the proportion of
survey respondents who were identity theft victims is quite small. Stratified
random sampling selects even outcomes from both groups of the strata variable,
Victim, to ensure that the model building will give enough attention to the
critical event, which is the prediction of identity theft victims. As seen in Figure
4.29a and Figure 4.29b, both the train and test samples contain even proportions
(10%) of the strata variable.
(a) Train Sample. (b) Test Sample.
Figure 4.29: Stratified Random Sampling
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4.3.4.4 Classification and regression trees
Classification and Regression Trees (CART) is a nonparametric data mining algo-
rithm popularised by Breiman et al. (1984) and used to generate either classifica-
tion or regression trees. Classification trees are applied to data with a categorical
dependent variable and regression trees to data with a numeric dependent vari-
able. In this study the variable of interest, Victim, is categorical in nature and
therefore the exploration of the classification trees technique follows.
The CART data analysis determines the correlation between the variable of
interest and a large set of possible predictor variables (Sut & Simsek, 2011).
Tree branches or splits are made by variables that best predict the variable of
interest. Every tree node can be split into two child nodes and all variables are
seen as independents when splits are calculated. The stopping rules of CART
then determine the size of the tree (Electronic Version: StatSoft, 2013).
Misclassification of the variable of interest is inevitable since no model is
perfect. Some misclassifications are worse than others. For example, it is worse
misclassifying an individual as not an identity theft victim when the individual
actually is one than when misclassifying the person as a victim when not a victim.
Statistica accounts for misclassification in the CART model tool by assigning
misclassification costs to the variable of interest (Electronic Version: StatSoft,
2013).
It was noted that misclassification costs were not needed for the CART model
in the research study. This was tested by assigning a misclassification cost of two
to the misclassifying of victims as non-victims, the result of this action was that
the model classified 100% of the cases as victims, which was not feasible, because
as demonstrated in Figure 4.14, 89% of the cases were actually non-victims. The
misclassification cost for the model was therefore set to equal 1 for both of the
dependent variable outcomes as seen in Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8: CART Misclassification Costs.
Misclassification Costs.
Observed no Observed yes
Predicted no 1
Predicted yes 1
It is recommended by Breiman et al. (1984) to use the Gini index to decrease
the impurity when splitting for classification. According to Sut & Simsek (2011),
the Gini index becomes zero when a single class is present at a node, meaning
that all the cases at a node are from the same class if the Gini index is zero.
The Gini index was therefore selected as the goodness of fit parameter. The Cen-
tre for Statistical Consultation at Stellenbosch University advised that Statistica
performs better when the option for equal prior probabilities is selected as op-
posed to when prior probabilities are estimated. The researcher did a preliminary
investigation by comparing the results of the prospective model for both options
and found that estimated priors presented better results.
According to Ripley (1996), when misclassification costs are equal and pri-
ors estimated, decision trees are pruned with the minimal cost-complexity cross
validation pruning method. The stopping rule was therefore the pruning on mis-
classification error along with the stopping parameters ‘minimum number of cases’
and ‘maximum number of nodes’ that were set to the Statistica default values.
Table 4.9 presents a summary of all the model input parameters.
Table 4.9: CART Parameter Tuning Values.
CART Parameters
Parameter Values
Goodness of fit Gini
Prior Probabilities Equal
Min n of Cases 400
Max n of nodes 1000
The test sample estimate was selected for the validation of the model. The
total number of cases were divided into two samples. A train sample containing
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70% of the cases that was used to construct the predictor variables and a test
sample of the remaining cases to test the performance of the trained model.
The chain of optimal trees, theory being explained in Breiman et al. (1984),
that was found for the CART model according to their cross validation (CV) and
resubstitution costs or learning costs are exhibited in Figure 4.30. It illustrates
that resubstitution costs decrease as the tree sizes increase. This is due to the
misclassification rate that improves with the increase of the number of terminal
nodes. V-fold cross validation is performed, when using the cost-complexity prun-
ing method, as each split is added to the tree to determine the CV costs. It is
important to notice that the absolute cost value is not what is being observed,
the trend is the aspect of importance.
Tree number four, which had three terminal nodes, was the best tree size
option, because it was located at the point where CV cost started to level out
and where the resubstitution cost has not dropped to a point where predictive
accuracy could start to be jeopardised by overfitting.
Figure 4.30: CART Cost Sequence.
Figure 4.31 presents the chosen tree with its three terminal nodes. Splits were
made for the variable Age and the variable Physical Address on platform option
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‘None’. If respondents were older than 26.5 years, or if they were younger than
26.5 years and their physical address was shared on some social media platform,
they were classified as identity theft victims.
Figure 4.31: Selected CART Tree with Three Terminal Nodes.
Table 4.10 lists the top 20 predictor variables according to a 0–100 scale as
determined by the calculation described in Breiman et al. (1984). It is observed
that the predictor variable with the highest ranking score was Age, which was
expected in the CRISP data understanding phase.
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Table 4.10: CART Variable Importance.
Variable Importance
n Variable Name Rank
1 Age 100
2 Relationship Status (Married) 91
3 ID Details (Facebook) 60
4 Address (None) 57
5 ID Details (None) 56
6 Job Details (None) 53
7 Address (Facebook) 46
8 Relationship Status (Single) 43
9 Platform Subscription (Mxit) 41
10 Job Details (LinkedIn) 35
11 Name (Pinterest) 33
12 Name (LinkedIn) 31
13 Race (Pinterest) 29
14 University Details (LinkedIn) 29
15 Surname (LinkedIn) 26
16 School Details (LinkedIn) 26
17 Surname (Pinterest) 26
18 Gender 25
19 Platform Subscription (LinkedIn) 25
20 University Details (Instagram) 25
The prediction results for the train sample response variable, Victim, is pre-
sented in Table 4.11. More than half of the observed victims were classified
correctly and almost 70% of the non-victims were classified correctly. The model
detected victims quite well, when considering the small number (10%) of victims
in the actual data sample.
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Table 4.11: CART Train Sample Prediction Results.
Train Prediction Results
Variable: Victim Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 1804 (66.62%) 146 (33.38%)
Observed yes 904 (46.20%) 170 (53.80%)
The testing sample displayed very similar prediction results to the training
sample as observed in Table 4.12.
Table 4.12: CART Test Sample Prediction Results.
Test Prediction Results
Variable: Victim Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 769 (66.24%) 62 (33.76%)
Observed yes 392 (45.93%) 73 (54.07%)
Train and test sample cross-tabulation was used to determine if the right
size tree was found based on how well the tree performed when classifying the
test data (Electronic Version: StatSoft, 2013). The cross-tabulation results for
the train sample and test samples are presented in Figure 4.32 and Figure 4.33
respectively. The two samples indicated very similar results and it was therefore
concluded that the right tree size was chosen.
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Figure 4.32: Cross-tabulation Results for Training Sample.
Figure 4.33: Cross-tabulation Results for Testing Sample.
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4.3.4.5 Boosted trees for classification
Boosted trees compare a sequence of simple binary trees according to their mis-
classifications. For every step the boosted trees algorithm calculates the optimal
partitioning of the data as well as the deviations of the observed values from the
residuals for each partition. The next tree is then fitted to the preceding tree’s
residuals, to identify another partition that will reduce the residual variance for
the data. By voting the best tree from these simple trees, a final classification is
made. This technique has developed into one of the top methods for predictive
data mining over the last few years (Electronic Version: StatSoft, 2013).
The default tree options to build a boosted tree model in Statistica are pre-
sented in Table 4.13.
Table 4.13: Default Boosted Tree Options.
Default Boosted Tree Options
Learning Rate Number of addi-
tive terms
Subsample pro-
portion
Test Data Pro-
portion
0.1 200 1 0.3
Stopping parameters control the complexity of the tree. The default stopping
parameters for boosted trees in Statistica are given in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14: Default Boosted Tree Stopping Parameters.
Default Stopping Parameters
Minimum n of
cases
Minimum n in
child node
Maximum n of
levels
Maximum n of
nodes
15 1 10 3
The goal of the model is to best predict identity theft victims as victims and
non-victims as non-victims. It is however much more costly to incorrectly clas-
sify a victim as a non-victim than it is to mistake a non-victim for a victim.
Misclassification costs account for situations like these. The first parameter to
determine was therefore misclassification cost. Models were built for the misclas-
sification costs listed in Table 4.15. The default boosted tree options in Table
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4.13 and default stopping parameters in Table 4.14 were used in the initial model
building.
By comparing standard errors and prediction results, the misclassification
cost of 70 for misclassifying ‘Yes’ as ‘No’, yielded the best results. The training
set resulted in a standard error of 0.001079, 78.69% of non-victims classified
correctly and 38.92% of victims classified correctly. The testing set presented
results that differed only a little with a standard error of 0.001694, 79.24% of
non-victims classified correctly and 40.74% of victims classified correctly. These
were the results obtained before parameter tuning commenced. The train and
test samples indicated similar results, which indicated good model performance,
but further investigation was still required in terms of the parameters.
Table 4.15: Boosted Tree Misclassification Cost Options.
Victim
Observed no - Predicted yes Observed yes - Predicted no
1 1; 10; 20; 30; 40; 50; 60; 70; 80; 90; 100
In Electronic Version: StatSoft (2013) learning rates of 0.1 and smaller are
recommended as they tend to produce the top prediction models. Subsample
proportion indicates the proportion of data points randomly selected at each
iteration without replacement (Elith et al., 2008). The Centre for Statistical
Consultation at SU advised the use of all the data points, meaning a subsample
of one, for smaller data sets like the one for this study, but Elith et al. (2008)
reckon that subsample proportions improve model performance and therefore
used a subsample of 0.5 in their study. The parameter values listed in Table 4.16
were therefore chosen to be tested for model building.
Cross-validation, as recommended by Elith et al. (2008) for small data sets,
was used to determine the best combination of parameters. After numerous
models were run, the parameter values that yielded the best prediction of identity
theft victims were determined. The two parameters first resolved were learning
rate and subsample proportion. It was observed that a learning rate of 0.05 in
combination with a subsample proportion of one yielded the best set of train and
test sample prediction results for the variable Victim. The parameters ‘maximum
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n of levels’, ‘minimum n of cases’ and ‘minimum n of nodes’ all have an affect on
tree complexity (Elith et al., 2008).
Table 4.16: Boosted Tree Parameter Tuning Values.
Parameter Tuning
Parameter Values
Learning Rate 0.1, 0.05
Subsample proportion 0.5, 1
Minimum n of cases 15, 30
Maximum n of levels 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 15, 20
Maximum n of nodes 3, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Number of trees 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1500
The trial and error process was used to test the different values for the param-
eters by comparing the standard errors calculated by the various models. The
parameter combination with the lowest standard error was for the model with
parameter values: ‘maximum n of levels’ = 5, ‘minimum n of cases’ = 15 and
‘minimum n of nodes’ = 12. The model yielded a standard error of 0.0011 for
the training sample and a standard error of 0.0015 for the test sample.
Figure 4.34: Boosted Optimal Trees.
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The final parameter to determine was the number of trees. The optimal
number of trees was calculated as 900 for the model constructed with the above
mentioned parameter values. As illustrated in Figure 4.34, the average multino-
mial deviance did not improve much after a number of 900 trees. Table 4.17,
Table 4.18 and Table 4.19 display a summary of the final parameter values that
were used for final model building.
Table 4.17: Boosted Tree Options.
Boosted Tree Options
Learning Rate Number of addi-
tive terms
Subsample pro-
portion
Test Data Pro-
portion
0.05 200 1 0.3
Table 4.18: Boosted Stopping Parameters.
Stopping Parameters
Minimum
n of cases
Minimum n
in child node
Maximum
n of levels
Maximum
n of nodes
Number of
trees
15 1 5 12 900
Table 4.19: Boosted Tree Misclassification Costs.
Misclassification Costs
Observed no Observed yes
Predicted no 70
Predicted yes 1
Table 4.20 lists the top 20 predictor variables according to the 0–100 scale
determined by the calculation described in Breiman et al. (1984) as previously
mentioned during the CART model construction.
96
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.3 Application of CRISP
Table 4.20: Boosted Tree Variable Importance.
Variable Importance
n Variable Rank
1 Age 100
2 University Details (Instagram) 59
3 Relationship Status (Married) 38
4 ID Details (Facebook) 25
5 Platform Subscription (Mxit) 22
6 School Details (Instagram) 21
7 ID Details (None) 18
8 Platform Subscription (LinkedIn) 14
9 Job Details (LinkedIn) 14
10 Name (LinkedIn) 13
11 Surname (LinkedIn) 13
12 Gender (LinkedIn) 11
13 Name (Instagram) 11
14 University Details (LinkedIn) 10
15 Platform Subscription (Instagram) 10
16 Email (LinkedIn) 9
17 Job Details (None) 9
18 Relationship Status (In a relationship) 9
19 Platform Subscription (Youtube) 8
20 School Details (LinkedIn) 8
The training sample’s prediction results are presented in Table 4.21. The
model predicts observed non-victims as non-victims much more accurately than
observed victims as victims. This is due to the small proportion of only 11% of
victims in the original data set.
97
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.3 Application of CRISP
Table 4.21: Boosted Tree Train Sample Prediction Results.
Train Prediction Results
Variable: Victim Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 1923 (71.01%) 785 (28.99%)
Observed yes 160 (50.63%) 156 (49.37%)
In Table 4.22 the prediction results of the testing sample is given. The pre-
diction results of the testing sample are slightly less accurate compared to those
of the training sample, but still very close. The model performed well and the
parameters chosen for the Boosted Tree model were therefore deemed feasible.
Table 4.22: Boosted Tree Test Sample Prediction Results.
Test Prediction Results
Variable: Victim Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 808 (69.60%) 353 (30.40%)
Observed yes 71 (52.59%) 64 (47.41%)
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4.3.4.6 Chi Square Automatic Interaction Detection
The Chi Square Automatic Interaction Detection (CHAID) model is one of the
oldest classification methods. The model is a type of decision tree that uses the
Bonferoni p–value testing. CHAID implements multi-level splits instead of the
binary splits performed in CART. Like the CART model, the CHAID model only
builds one tree. This method is often used for direct marketing and it requires
large data sets for reliable analysis.
The default values for the CHAID model in Statistica are presented in Table
4.23. All explanatory variables in the CHAID model must be categorical (Elec-
tronic Version: StatSoft, 2013). The only continuous variable Age was therefore
categorised into nine age groups: 18–20, 21–30, 31–40, 41–50, 51–60, 61–70, 71–
80, 81–90 and 91–100.
Table 4.23: Default CHAID Stopping Parameters.
Default Stopping Parameters
Minimum n Maximum n of
nodes
Probability for
splitting
Probability for
merging
432 1000 .05 .05
Table 4.24: CHAID Misclassification Cost Options.
Victim
Observed no - Predicted yes Observed yes - Predicted no
1 1; 10; 20; 30; 40; 50; 60; 70; 80; 90; 100
The misclassification costs listed in Table 4.24 were tested with the default
parameters as input parameters to the models. The best classification cost was
then determined by the comparison of the various model’s prediction results. It
turned out that misclassification costs had no effect on the prediction outcomes
of the model and it was thus decided that the misclassification costs for the final
model were set to equal for the response variable Victim as seen in Table 4.25.
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Table 4.25: CHAID Misclassification Costs.
Misclassification Costs
Observed no Observed yes
Predicted no 1
Predicted yes 1
The remaining parameters that needed tuning and the considered values are
listed in Table 4.26. It was seen that if the probability for splitting was set to zero,
all cases were classified as non-victims, which is not viable. All the options with a
splitting and merging probability bigger than or equal to 0.15 presented identical
prediction results, but as the splitting and merging probabilities decreased to less
than 0.15, the model gradually performed better when the train sample prediction
results were compared to the test sample results. It was determined that the
best combination for the parameters were the default values, which were a 0.05
probability for splitting and a 0.05 probability for merging.
Table 4.26: CHAID Parameter Tuning Values.
Parameter Tuning
Parameter Values
Minimum n 1, 15, 30, 45, 60, 75, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500
Maximum n of nodes 500, 1000, 2000
(Probability for splitting;
Probability for merging)
(1;0), (0;1), (0.7;0.3), (0.3;0.7), (0.5;0.5), (0;0),
(1;1), (0.05;0.05), (0.1;0.1), (0.15;0.15), (0.2;0.2)
The various investigated values for the parameter ‘maximum number of nodes’
did not have any effect on the prediction results, risk estimates or standard errors
of the train and test samples. The default value of 1 000 was therefore again
chosen for the final model. The final parameter that needed tuning was ‘minimum
n’. It was noticed that the model performance, measured by comparing the
train and test sample prediction results, increased as the value for ‘minimum
n’ increased until it reached 60. After that the model performance weakened
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drastically. The final value chosen for parameter ‘minimum n’ was therefore 60.
Table 4.27 shows a summary of the final stopping parameters.
Table 4.27: CHAID Stopping Parameters.
Stopping Parameters
Minimum n Maximum n
of nodes
Probability for
splitting
Probability for
merging
60 1000 0.05 0.05
The final model, constructed with the parameters in Table 4.27, delivered the
risk estimates and standard errors listed in Table 4.28.
Table 4.28: CHAID Risk Estimates.
Risk Estimate Standard error
Train 0.102513 0.005515
Test 0.104938 0.008513
The predictor variables presented in Table 4.29 were ranked according to the
Bonferoni adjusted p–value of the corresponding chi-square test calculated for the
first node of the tree. The final tree consisted of 43 nodes.
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Table 4.29: CHAID Variable Importance.
Variable Importance
n Variable Chi–square p–value
1 Age 49.36 0.00000
2 Relationship Status (Married) 44.23 0.00000
3 Job Details (None) 18.28 0.00002
4 ID Details (Facebook) 16.53 0.00005
5 Job Details (LinkedIn) 16.15 0.00006
6 ID Details (None) 15.16 0.00010
7 Relationship Status (Single) 13.65 0.00022
8 University Details (LinkedIn) 13.08 0.00030
9 Name (LinkedIn) 13.00 0.00031
10 School Details (LinkedIn) 11.99 0.00053
11 Surname (LinkedIn) 11.45 0.00072
12 Physical Address (None) 11.36 0.00075
13 Platform Subscription (LinkedIn) 10.93 0.00095
14 Birthday (LinkedIn) 10.81 0.00101
15 Physical Address (LinkedIn) 10.50 0.00119
16 Physical Address (Facebook) 9.91 0.00164
17 Gender 8.98 0.00273
18 Platform Subscription (Mxit) 8.73 0.00313
19 Name (Pinterest) 8.24 0.00410
20 Surname (Pinterest) 6.90 0.00861
The final prediction results for the response variable Victim for the train and
test samples are displayed in Table 4.30 and Table 4.31 respectively.
Table 4.30: CHAID Train Sample Prediction Results.
Train Prediction Results
Variable: Victim Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 2697 (99.59%) 11 (0.41%)
Observed yes 268 (84.81%) 48 (15.19%)
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Table 4.31: CHAID Test Sample Prediction Results.
Test Prediction Results
Variable: Victim Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 1140 (98.19%) 21 (1.81%)
Observed yes 128 (94.81%) 7 (5.19%)
Table 4.30 and Table 4.31 illustrate that the model classified 15.19% of the
observed victims correctly in the training sample and only 5.19% in the test
sample. The model is therefore not a very good predictor for victims. This can
be explained by the small proportion of victims in the data set and the fact
that CHAID works best for large data sets and the data set for this study only
consisted of 4 320 cases. It is however a very good predictor for non-victims.
103
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.3 Application of CRISP
4.3.4.7 Random forest
The random forest model is a non-parametric model that consists of a series of
simple trees. For every single tree a different training sample is randomly selected
from the data set, with replacement, and then used to predict a classification
(Touw et al., 2013). The random forest then predicts the classification that was
predicted by the majority of the trees, the forest (Electronic Version: StatSoft,
2013).
The default parameter options for the random forest model in Statistica are
shown in Table 4.32 and the default stopping parameters in Table 4.33. The Gini
index is used as impurity measure in the Random Forest model (Touw et al.,
2013).
Table 4.32: Default Random Forest Options.
Default Random Forest Options
Number of predictors Number of trees Subsample proportion
7 100 1
Table 4.33: Default Random Forest Stopping Parameters.
Default Random Forest Stopping Parameters
Minimum n of
cases
Minimum n in
child node
Maximum n of
levels
Maximum n of
nodes
432 1 10 100
According to Svetnik et al. (2003), the only parameter that really needs tun-
ing in random forest is ‘number of predictors’. The number of predictors controls
how many independent predictors are considered at each node (Electronic Ver-
sion: StatSoft, 2013). The “number of trees’ parameter determines the model
complexity and should be considered to avoid overfitting. The two parameters
that were therefore tuned were ‘the number of trees’ and ‘the number of predic-
tors’. The values that were tested are displayed in Table 4.34.
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Table 4.34: Random Forest Parameter Tuning Values.
Parameter Tuning
Parameter Values
Number of trees 100, 500, 1000
Number of predictors 3, 7, 14, 28, 42, 56, 70, 84, 95
All the values for the parameter ‘number of predictors’ were tested. It was
observed that the value that performed the best when prediction results for the
response variable Victim were compared for the train and test samples, was 42.
The value for the ‘number of trees’ parameter that presented the best performing
model was 100. It is therefore safe to say that overfitting occurred for the values
500 and 1 000. The default values for misclassification were equal. The effect of
assigning a misclassification cost of two for misclassifying victims as non-victims,
was tested, and it resulted in a model that performed much weaker.
After considering all of the above the decided parameters for the final Random
Forest model were the misclassification costs displayed in Table 4.35 and the
random forest options as listed in Table 4.36.
Table 4.35: Random Forest Misclassification Costs.
Misclassification Costs
Observed no Observed yes
Predicted no 1
Predicted yes 1
Table 4.36: Random Forest Options.
Random Forest Options
Number of predic-
tors
Number of trees Subsample propor-
tion
42 100 1
Figure 4.35 illustrates that the misclassification rate of the train data sample
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is less than the misclassification rate of the test data sample for all of the 100
trees.
Figure 4.35: Random Forest Misclassification Rate.
As calculated by the constructed Random Forest model, the 20 variables that
were seen as the best predictors for the response variable Victim were the vari-
ables listed in Table 4.37.
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Table 4.37: Random Forest Variable Importance.
Variable Importance
n Variable Rank
1 Age 100
2 Gender 40
3 Race (Facebook) 39
4 Cell Number (None) 39
5 Race (None) 39
6 Email (Facebook) 38
7 Cell Number (Facebook) 38
8 Relationship Status (None) 38
9 Surname (Youtube) 38
10 Relationship Status (Facebook) 38
11 Platform Subscribtion (Youtube) 37
12 Job Details (Facebook) 37
13 Name (Youtube) 37
14 Platform Subscribtion (Pinterest) 36
15 Surname (Twitter) 36
16 Email (Youtube) 36
17 Gender (LinkedIn) 36
18 Birthday Details (LinkedIn) 35
19 Gender (Instagram) 35
20 Platform Subscription (Twitter) 35
The prediction results for the train and test samples are seen in Table 4.38
and Table 4.39. The model predicted non-victims much better than victims,
but considering the small number of responders that were actually observed as
victims, the model predicted victims quite well. The training and test samples
presented similar predictions for the classification of non-victims and the test
sample performed slightly weaker than the train sample with the classification of
victims. It can therefore be concluded that the model performed well in general
and that the input parameters were therefore feasible.
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Table 4.38: Random Forest Train Sample Prediction Results.
Train Prediction Results
Variable: Victim Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 2267 (83.71%) 441 (16.29%)
Observed yes 164 (51.90%) 152 (48.10%)
Table 4.39: Random Forest Test Sample Prediction Results.
Test Prediction Results
Variable: Victim Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 958 (82.52%) 203 (17.48%)
Observed yes 83 (61.48%) 52 (38.52%)
4.3.5 CRISP phase 5: Evaluation
In this phase all models were compared and it was determined which model
performed the best, relative to the other models, with the classification of victims
and non-victims of identity theft.
In the credit scoring study done by Lee et al. (2006), the decision tree models
were evaluated by the comparison of the training and test sample prediction
results. Table 4.40 and Table 4.41 are summaries of the prediction results of the
train and test samples for all of the models tested in this study; Boosted Tree,
CART, CHAID and Random Forest. When models were built using the training
data sample, the CHAID model performed the best with the correct classification
of non-victims with a 99.59% success rate and the CART model with the correct
classification of victims with a 53.80% success rate as illustrated in Table 4.40.
The model with the best overall classification was the Random Forest model with
an average correct classification of 65.91%.
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Table 4.40: Summary of Prediction Results for Training Set.
Summary of Prediction Results for training set
Correctly Classi-
fied Victim
Boosted
Tree
CART CHAID Random
Forest
Category: No 71.01% 66.62% 99.59% 83.71%
Category: Yes 49.37% 53.80% 15.19% 48.10%
Average Correct
Classification %
60.19% 60.21% 57.39% 65.91%
In Table 4.41 it is seen that the models that correctly classified the dependent
variable best when the test data was used in the models, were once again CHAID
with a 98.19% success rate for non-victims and CART with a 54.07% success rate
for victims. The CART and Random Forest model indicated very similar average
correct classifications, but once again the Random Forest model performed the
best with 0.36%, which is a total number of 16 cases more correctly classified.
Table 4.41: Summary of Prediction Results for Testing Set.
Summary of Prediction Results for testing set
Correctly Classi-
fied Victim
Boosted
Tree
CART CHAID Random
Forest
Category: No 69.60% 66.24% 98.19% 82.52%
Category: Yes 47.41% 54.07% 5.19% 38.52%
Average Correct
Classification %
58.51% 60.16% 51.69% 60.52%
In general Type I errors, when ID non-victims are wrongly classified as vic-
tims, have lower misclassification costs than Type II errors, when ID-victims are
misclassified as non-victims (Lee et al., 2006). In this study the misclassification
costs for the models CART, CHAID and Random Forest were set to equal as
it did not affect the prediction results. Boosted Trees, however performed best
with a misclassification cost of 70 for Type II errors to 1 for Type I errors. It
is therefore needed to review the Type I and Type II error results presented in
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Table 4.42. The model with the lowest Type II error percentage was the CART
model. The misclassification costs assigned for the Type II errors in the Boosted
Tree model helped as it presented the second lowest Type II error percentages.
The CHAID model displayed the lowest Type I error percentages, followed by
the Random Forest model with the second lowest Type I error percentages. It
is however important that Type I and Type II errors are taken into account and
therefore the model with the lowest combination of errors was the Random Forest
model.
Table 4.42: Type I and Type II Errors of the Four Models.
Train Sample Results Test Sample Results
Type I error Type II error Type I error Type II error
CART 33.38% 46.2% 33.76% 45.93%
Boosted Trees 28.99% 50.63% 30.4% 52.59%
CHAID 0.41% 84.81% 1.81% 94.81%
Random Forest 16.29% 51.9% 17.48% 61.48%
These observations were recorded during the building phase of the models
and were however not the best reflection of how well the models were actually
performing. In order to compare the models more effectively and to score new
data with the models, the Rapid Deployment Tool in Statistica, described in
Nisbet et al. (2009), was used.
4.3.5.1 Application of the rapid deployment tool
The program Statistica has the capability of generating deployment code for the
evaluation of prediction models and the scoring of new data. The four deploy-
ment code options are: Statistica Visual Basic for dataminer workspaces, C or
C++ language for custom deployment tools, Predictive Model Markup Language
(PMML) script for rapid deployment or code for deployment to the Statistica
enterprise (Electronic Version: StatSoft, 2013).
All top commercial and open source data mining tools produce and support
PMML code (Guazzelli, 2015). This function enables users to rapidly implement
prediction models in practice without a hassle (Guazzelli, 2015). It was therefore
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decided to use PMML code in the rapid deployment tool that Statistica offers.
The tool is able to load the PMML code of multiple models, compare the mod-
els with lift and gains charts and make predictions with new data (Electronic
Version: StatSoft, 2013).
The PMML code for the CART, CHAID, Boosted Trees and Random Forest
models were extracted and uploaded to the rapid deployment tool in Statistica.
Refer to the enclosed CD for the PMML code files of the various models. Figure
4.36 is a snapshot of the PMML code for the Boosted Tree model. The tool
ran the various models on the full data set, which included the training and test
sample data.
Figure 4.36: Snapshot of Boosted Trees PMML Code as Example.
Gains charts were used to display the percentage of observations that were
correctly classified for the two dependent variable categories (Electronic Ver-
sion: StatSoft, 2013). The gain percentage is equal to the number of accurately
predicted responses relative to the total number of responses in that percentile.
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The goal is to maximize the curve from the baseline. In Figure 4.37 the gains
chart for the category ‘Yes’ of the variable Victim is displayed. The baseline,
which represents no-model, is indicated with a blue line. The results for the four
models were very close and almost in line with the baseline. The Boosted Tree
model was on the baseline, the CART model performed a little better than the
Boosted Tree model, the CHAID model slightly better than the CART model
and the Random Forest model closely outperformed CHAID to be the best clas-
sifier of victims. The small gain for the four models is subjected to the small
proportion, 11% of the total cases, that were observed as victims in the data set.
In conclusion it is seen that the prediction of victims with models presents almost
the same results as if there was no model. This problem can be solved if more
data points that were actual observed victims are included in the data set.
Figure 4.37: Gains Chart for Victim Category: ‘Yes’.
In Figure 4.38 the gains chart for the category ‘No’ of the variable Victim
is presented. It can be observed that the Random Forest model presented the
biggest gain from the baseline. This therefore indicates that the Random Forest
model contributes the most accuracy to the correct classification of non-victims
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Figure 4.38: Gains Chart for Victim Category: ‘No’.
when compared to the other models or the baseline, which represents no model.
The model that performed second best was again the CHAID model, but results
were not as close as in Figure 4.37 with the classification of victims.
Lift charts are used to present the effectiveness of a model relative to no
model (Electronic Version: StatSoft, 2013). The baseline is the percentage of
actual observed responses, for the dependent variable category investigated, in
the data set. The actual observed values were 89.6% for non-victims and 10.4%
for victims. The lift value is then calculated by dividing the expected response
when using a predictive model with the expected response when no model is used,
the baseline percentage, per cumulative percentile.
It is illustrated in Figure 4.39 that the Random Forest model was the most
effective with the prediction of non-victims as it had the highest percentage of
expected classifications for every percentile. Figure 4.40 indicates with the lift
values that once again the Random Forest model was the most effective with the
prediction of victims compared to the CART, CHAID and Boosted Tree models.
Once again it is important to note that the scale of the figures are proportional to
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Figure 4.39: Lift Chart for Victim Category: ‘No’.
the amount of actual observed values and the figures serve to present the trends
in the predictions rather that the absolute prediction values.
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Figure 4.40: Lift Chart for Victim Category :‘Yes’.
The gains charts’ model accuracy presentation and lift charts’ model effective-
ness presentation both suggest that the Random Forest model performs better
than the CART, CHAID and Boosted Trees models. With these results in com-
bination with the prediction results in Table 4.40 and Table 4.41 it is concluded
that the Random Forest model is the prediction model that best classified the
dependent variable, Victim.
4.3.6 CRISP phase 6: Deployment
In this phase new data is scored with the best performing prediction model, the
Random Forest model, determined in the Evaluation phase.
The cut-off date for the survey, discussed in Chapter 3, was the end of May
2016. There were 41 survey responses received after this date, which were not
included in the original data set that was used in the data analysis. The 41
late survey responses were retrieved in August and used as the new cases for
the deployment of the model. Figure 4.41 shows a histogram of the responses
for the variable Victim, which is a good representation of the original data set,
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because the victim percentage of 10% is a good reflection of the common observed
proportion.
Figure 4.41: Number of Responses for the Variable: Victim.
The rapid deployment tool in Statistica was used to apply the PMML code,
generated for the Random Forest Model, on the deployment data set. The re-
sulting error rate for the deployment data was 0.146341, showing that the model
adapted very well to the new data. The prediction results for the new data are
presented in Table 4.43. There were only four victim cases, three of them, 75%,
were classified correctly and 86.49% of the non-victims were classified correctly
resulting in an overall accuracy of 85.37%. The model performed very well, con-
sidering that the average prediction results for the training and test sample data
in the Evaluation phase were 43.31% for the correct classification of victims and
83.12% for the correct classification of non-victims.
Table 4.43: Summary of Deployment Prediction Results for the Random Forest
Model.
Random Forest Deployment Prediction Results
Predicted No Predicted Yes
Observed No 86.49% 13.51%
Observed Yes 25.00% 75.00%
For a final validation of the model it was decided to apply the PMML code
of the three remaining models on the deployment data set. Table 4.44, Table
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4.45 and Table 4.46 present the prediction results for the models Boosted Trees,
CART and CHAID respectively.
Table 4.44: Summary of Deployment Prediction Results for the Boosted Trees
Model.
Boosted Tree Deployment Prediction Results
Predicted No Predicted Yes
Observed No 0% 100%
Observed Yes 0% 100%
Table 4.45: Summary of Deployment Prediction Results for the CART Model.
CART Deployment Prediction Results
Predicted No Predicted Yes
Observed No 51.35% 48.65%
Observed Yes 25% 75%
Table 4.46: Summary of Deployment Prediction Results for the CHAID Model.
CHAID Deployment Prediction Results
Predicted No Predicted Yes
Observed No 97.30% 2.7%
Observed Yes 100% 0%
The Boosted Tree model misclassified all non-victims and the CHAID model
misclassified all victims. These two models did therefore not present feasible
results. The CART model, like the Random Forest model, correctly classified 75%
of the victims, but only classified 51.35% of the non-victims correctly compared to
the 86.49% correctly classified non-victims of the Random Forest model. It is thus
safe to conclude that the Random Forest model is the prediction model that best
satisfies the project objectives listed in the CRISP Business Understanding phase.
The associated variables that best predict identity theft victims are therefore the
variables presented in Table 4.37 in the CRISP Modelling phase.
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4.4 Data mining chapter summary
In this chapter the CRISP data mining model was used as guideline during the
processing of the email survey data collected in Chapter 3. Data was screened and
prepared for model building. It was decided to use decision trees as prediction
models and the four identified models that were applied in the study were CART,
Boosted Trees, CHAID and Random Forest. Data was sampled into a training
and test set. The models were evaluated by cross-validation of the two sets. The
PMML code of each model was generated and imported into the Statistica Rapid
Deployment Tool. The Rapid Deploment Tool was used to construct gains and lift
charts to compare model’s prediction accuracy and effectiveness respectively. The
Random Forest model was observed as the model that performed the best. The
Random Forest model was therefore used to score 41 new cases in the CRISP
Deployment phase. To validate the model, the PMML code of the remaining
three models were applied to the deployment data set. It was concluded that
the Random Forest model outperformed the CART, CHAID and Boosted Trees
models.
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Results
In this chapter the research results are summarised for all of the research steps
and an overall conclusion of the results is then given.
5.1 Introduction to results
The data that was required for the research study was discussed in Section 3.1.
After a comprehensive literature review and reading of the social media privacy
policies included in Appendix A, it was found that the initial research method-
ology was not practical and a revised research methodology was suggested in
Section 3.4. The revised research methodology was followed for the execution of
the remaining study.
5.2 Summary of data included in the research
In Chapter 3, Section 3.3 information on identity theft victims that was general
and in a depersonalised format was collected from the SAFPS. The information
included the age, gender, marital status and income of all identity theft inci-
dents reported in the year 2015. A total number of 2 039 feasible incidents were
collected.
Information was then collected on the social media sharing habits and the
attributes age, gender, income, relationship status and identity theft victim status
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via an email survey. The email survey was sent to the SU population and had a
12% response rate. A total number of 4 320 responses were viable.
5.3 Results from the preliminary investigation
Chapter 3, Section 3.5 presented a preliminary investigation that was conducted
on the SAFPS and email survey data. This section therefore summarises the
results obtained from the investigation.
5.3.1 Preliminary investigation results: SAFPS
The information received from the SAFPS corresponded with that found in liter-
ature. The results received on the variables Age and Gender complied with that
found by Erasmus (2015) and Dirk (2015b), which stated that males between the
ages of 28 and 40 were prime targets for identity theft. The SAFPS data showed
that 69% of the incidents reported were male victims compared to only 31% be-
ing female and 45.5% of the victims were between the ages of 30 and 40 years.
The data on the variables Relationship Status and Income did not present
significant results due to insufficient data.
It was concluded that Gender and Age were possible identity theft predictor
variables. The data received from the SAFPS would serve as reference data for
the email survey data set.
5.3.2 Preliminary investigation results: email survey
Vulnerability scores were calculated for all the survey responses according to the
attributes that they have shared and the number of social media platforms the at-
tributes have been shared on. The average vulnerability scores were then grouped
for the variables Age, Gender, Relationship Status, Income and Victim. The
results on the variables Age and Gender for the survey data came as no surprise
as they once again agreed with literature and with the SAFPS results that the
ages which presented the highest average vulnerability scores were between 28
to 40 years and the average vulnerability percentage was again much higher for
male victims when compared to female victims. The relationship status with
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the highest average vulnerability score was ‘Married’ and the lowest score was
for the ‘No Status’ option. This could be that the relationship status of mar-
ried is mostly related to older people and not to students. The variable Income
contained many missing values and therefore these results were skewed and not
considered as noteworthy.
The final variable inspected was Victim, which grouped the population ac-
cording to individuals who have previously been offended by identity theft and
people who have never been offended. The derived average vulnerability scores
for the dependent variable Victim presented the expected results. The average
vulnerability score for previous identity theft victims was higher than the score
for non-victims.
It was concluded that the collected survey data displayed the expected results
and was sufficient to develop a prediction model. The prediction model was
therefore a realistic objective for the research study. The variables Gender and
Age consistently presented significant results and were strongly expected to be
predictor variables of identity theft in the prediction model.
5.4 Data mining results
In Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1, the email survey data task was determined as a clas-
sification type problem. As discussed in Section 4.2.2, the data mining model
found most suited for the research study was the CRISP model and the recom-
mended data technique for classification problems was determined as decision
trees in Section 4.3.4.1.
The CRISP data mining framework was followed in order to reach the follow-
ing goals presented in Section 4.3.1:
1. Determine the variables that best predict identity theft victims;
2. Find a predictive model that best classifies victims; and
3. Use the model to make decisions as to whether or not a social media user
is at risk of becoming an identity theft victim or not.
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The SAFPS data was used as reference variables and the email survey data
was used in the data mining process to construct the models.
5.4.1 Data exploration results
The survey data variables were screened graphically with histograms in Section
4.3.2.1. Variables that presented very low responses were excluded from the data
set in Section 4.3.2.2. A total number of 96 variables remained after the screening
process.
Relationship histograms were then constructed for the remaining 96 variables
in Section 4.3.2.3 to determine the expected predictor variables by observing the
percentage difference of previous identity theft victims for all the variable options.
The process revealed the expected predictor variables listed in Table 5.1. The
shared attributes along with the platforms they were shared on, presented in
brackets, are listed according to the percentage increase of identity theft victims
when the attribute was shared on the social media platform compared to when
it was not shared. This was done for social media platform subscription numbers
too. The average age of previous identity theft victims was determined as 27.85
years and it was seen that 3% more males than females have been victims. The
relationship status option of ‘Married’ showed an average of 9% more identity
theft victims than all of the other relationship status options.
These were only the variables that could potentially be predictor variables.
The final predictor variables were however determined by the prediction model
that performed the best during the Modelling Phase of the CRISP data mining
model.
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Table 5.1: Possible Predictor Variables.
Shared Attributes % Difference Shared Attributes % Difference
1 Identity number (None) 12% 23 Birthday (Other) 3%
2 Identity number (Facebook) 9% 24 Job details (Facebook) 2%
3 Physical address (LinkedIn) 9% 25 Cell number (LinkedIn) 2%
4 Identity number (LinkedIn) 7% 26 Name (Dating Sites) 2%
5 Physical address (None) 6% 27 Gender (Dating Sites) 2%
6 Job details (LinkedIn) 5% 28 Cell number (None) 2%
7 Job details (None) 5% 29 University/College details (None) 2%
8 Email address (Other) 5% 30 Surname (Other) 2%
9 Race (Dating Sites) 5% 31 Cell number (Other) 2%
10 Relationship status (Dating Sites) 5% 32 School details (None) 1%
11 Relationship status (LinkedIn) 5% 33 Surname (Dating Sites) 1%
12 Physical address (Facebook) 4% 34 Race (None) 1%
13 Name (LinkedIn) 4% 35 Email address (None) 1%
14 Surname (LinkedIn) 4% 36 Relationship status (None) 1%
15 Birthday (LinkedIn) 4% Platform Subscriptions % Difference
16 University/College details (LinkedIn) 4% 1 LinkedIn Subscription 4%
17 School details (LinkedIn) 4% 2 Mxit Subscription 4%
18 Surname (None) 4% 3 Dating Sites Subscription 3%
19 Race (Other) 4% Description Attributes
20 Gender (LinkedIn) 3% 1 Age Average 27.85
21 Race (LinkedIn) 3% 2 Gender Male (3%)
22 Email address (LinkedIn) 3% 3 Relationship status (Married) 9% lead
5.4.2 Prediction model results
After the careful consideration of all the different prediction techniques presented
in Section 4.3.4.1 it was decided to process the data with decision trees. The
following popular decision tree models that were discussed in Section 4.3.4.2 were
included in the research study: CART, CHAID, Random Forest and Boosted
Trees. The models were applied to the survey data in Section 4.3.4. The data
set was divided into a training sample, which consisted of 70% of the population
cases and a testing sample, which consisted of the remaining 30% of the popula-
tion cases. This was done to enable cross-validation between samples for model
evaluation. The results of the four prediction models are discussed in the sections
to follow.
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5.4.2.1 CART model results
The optimal CART tree, determined by resubstitution and CV costs as seen in
Figure 4.31, had three terminal nodes where splits were made for the variable Age
and the variable Physical Address on the platform option ‘None’. If individuals
were older than 26.5 years, or if they were younger than 26.5 years and their
physical address was shared on any social media platform, they were classified as
a potential identity theft victim.
The CART model performance was evaluated by the comparison of the train
and test sample prediction results. Table 5.2 displays the prediction results for
both samples. The train and the test samples illustrated similar results. The
model therefore performed quite well.
Table 5.2: CART Model Prediction Results for Train and Test Sample.
CART Model
Train Sample Results Test Sample Results
Predicted no Predicted yes Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 66.62% 33.38% 66.24% 33.76%
Observed yes 46.20% 53.80% 45.93% 54.07%
Table 4.10 presents the top 20 predictor variables for the CART model that
were determined according to a 0–100 scale as calculated by the method described
in (Breiman et al., 1984).
5.4.2.2 Boosted trees model results
The optimal number of trees was calculated as 900 for the Boosted Trees model.
In Figure 4.34 it is seen that the multinomial deviance did not improve much after
a number of 900 trees. It was determined that the Boosted Trees model performed
best when a misclassification cost of 70 was assigned to Type II errors. The same
evaluation process completed for the CART model was used to determine model
performance for the Boosted Trees model. The results for the training and test
samples is presented in Table 5.3. Again the results for the two samples were
complementary, which shows that the Boosted Trees model performed soundly.
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Table 5.3: Boosted Trees Model Prediction Results for Train and Test Sample.
Boosted Trees Model
Train Sample Results Test Sample Results
Predicted no Predicted yes Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 71.01% 28.99% 69.60% 30.40%
Observed yes 50.63% 49.37% 52.59% 47.41%
Table 4.20 presents the top 20 predictor variables calculated by the Boosted
Trees model. The variables are again ranked according to the 0–100 scale men-
tioned during the CART model results discussion.
5.4.2.3 CHAID model results
The CHAID model requests that all variables must be categorical. The only
continuous variable Age was therefore categorised into nine age groups. The final
CHAID tree consisted of 43 nodes.
The CHAID model exposed the prediction results exhibited in Table 5.4. The
comparison of the train and test sample data results disclosed the performance of
the model. The model detected non-victims of identity theft very accurately for
both samples, but the test sample performed weaker than the train sample with
the classification of victims. The model was therefore not as stable as the CART
and Boosted Trees models were. The poor results for the prediction of victims
could be explained by the fact that CHAID works best for large data sets and
the data set for this study consisted of 4 320 cases, of which only 475 cases were
observed victims.
Table 5.4: CHAID Model Prediction Results for Train and Test Sample.
CHAID Model
Train Sample Results Test Sample Results
Predicted no Predicted yes Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 99.59% 0.41% 98.19% 1.81%
Observed yes 84.81% 15.19% 94.81% 5.19%
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The predictor variables listed in Table 4.29 were ranked according to the Bon-
feroni adjusted p–value of the corresponding chi-square tests that were calculated
for the first node of the tree.
5.4.2.4 Random forest model results
A total number of 100 trees was built, each with a number of 42 predictors, for the
Random Forest model. The performance of the Random Forest Model is demon-
strated by the prediction results of the train and test samples on view in Table
5.5. The model performed well with the recognition of identity theft non-victims
as the train and test sample results were very close, but with the identification
of victims, performance decreased with the lower percentage correctly classified
victims in the test sample data.
Table 5.5: Random Forest Model Prediction Results for Train and Test Sample.
Random Forest Model
Train Sample Results Test Sample Results
Predicted no Predicted yes Predicted no Predicted yes
Observed no 83.71% 16.29% 82.52% 17.48%
Observed yes 51.90% 48.10% 61.48% 38.52%
As calculated by the constructed Random Forest model, the 20 variables that
were seen as the best predictors for the response variable Victim were the vari-
ables listed in Table 4.37.
5.4.3 Prediction model evaluation results
In the credit-scoring study done by Lee et al. (2006), the decision tree models were
evaluated by the comparison of the training and test sample prediction results.
It was found that this method was suitable for the evaluation of the prediction
models applied in this study. Table 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 display the prediction
results for the training and test samples of the CART, Boosted Trees, CHAID
and Random Forest models respectively. It was however important to not only
compare Type I and Type II errors separately, but to compare an overall average
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prediction of the models. The average results for the training and test samples
for all four of the models are therefore presented in Table 5.6. The CHAID model
performed the best with the correct classification of non-victims with a 99.59%
success rate and the CART model with the correct classification of victims with a
53.80% success rate. The model with the best overall classification was however
the Random Forest model with an average correct classification of 65.91% for the
training sample and 60.52% for the test sample.
Table 5.6: Average Prediction Results for the Four Decision Tree Models.
Average Classification % Training Sample Test Sample
CART 60.21% 60.16%
Boosted Trees 60.19% 58.51%
CHAID 57.39% 51.69%
Random Forest 65.91% 60.52%
In order to evaluate the models even further, the PMML codes of all the
models were generated and applied to the full data set with the Rapid Deployment
Tool in Statistica. Gains charts were created to display the prediction accuracy
of the four models and lift charts to demonstrate the effectiveness of the models.
Figure 4.38 on page 113 displays the gains chart for the classification of vic-
tims. The results for the four models were very close. The small gain for the four
models is subjected to the small proportion, 11% of the total cases, that were
observed as victims in the data set. The model with the best accuracy in the
classification of victims, even though it was by a very small gain, was the Ran-
dom Forest model. The gains chart for non–victim classification can be seen in
Figure 4.37 on page 112. The Random Forest clearly presented the biggest gain
and was therefore the model that performed the best in this category. Overall it
could be concluded that the Random Forest model was the most accurate in the
classification of the dependent variable, Victim.
Lift charts were used to present the effectiveness of the models relative to no
model. It was illustrated in Figure 4.39 on page 114 that the Random Forest
model was the most effective with the prediction of non-victims as it had the
highest percentage of expected classifications for every percentile. Figure 4.40 on
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page 115 indicates with the lift values that once again the Random Forest model
was the most effective with the expected prediction of victims compared to the
CART, CHAID and Boosted Tree models.
The gains charts’ model accuracy presentation and lift charts’ model effective-
ness exhibition both suggested that the Random Forest model performed better
than the CART, CHAID and Boosted Trees models. With these results in combi-
nation with the prediction results in Table 5.6 it was concluded that the Random
Forest model was the prediction model that best classified the dependent variable,
Victim.
5.4.4 Deployment and validation of the random forest model
In order to deploy the Random Forest model, new data that contained the same
input variables was required. In Section 4.3.6 it is discussed how the data of the
41 respondents, who did not make the survey deadline and which was therefore
not included in the data mining data set, was used to create a deployment data
set. The histogram in Figure 4.41 presents the responses for the variable, Victim,
which was found to be a good representation of the original data set, because the
victim percentage of 10% is a good reflection of the victim percentage of 11% in
the original data mining data set.
The Rapid Deployment Tool was used to apply the trained PMML code of
the Random Forest model to the new deployment data set. The prediction error
rate for the Random Forest model in the evaluation phase was 0.206250. The
prediction error rate is calculated by adding the test sample error to the training
sample error. The error rate for the deployment data was 0.146341, showing that
the model adapted very well to the new data. The prediction results can be seen in
Table 4.43. There were only four victim cases, three of them, 75%, were classified
correctly and 86.49% of the non-victims were classified correctly resulting in an
overall accuracy of 85.37%. The model performed very well, considering that the
average prediction results for the training and test sample data in the Evaluation
phase were 43.31% for the correct classification of victims and 83.12% for the
correct classification of non-victims.
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For a final validation of the model, it was decided to compare the model’s
ability to score new data by applying the PMML code of the CART, CHAID
and Boosted Trees models and observe how they perform relative to the Random
Forest Model. As seen in Table 5.7, the Boosted Tree model misclassified all non-
victims and the CHAID model misclassified all victims. These two models did
not therefore present feasible results. The CART model, like the Random Forest
model, correctly classified 75% of the victims, but only classified 51.35% of the
non-victims correctly compared to the 86.49% correctly classified non-victims of
the Random Forest model. It can therefore be concluded that the Random Forest
model was indeed the best prediction model for the classification of identity theft
victims.
Table 5.7: Prediction Results on Deployment Data for Decision Trees
Prediction Results Correct classification of non-victims Correct classification of victims
CART 51.35% 75%
Boosted Trees 0% 100%
CHAID 97.3% 0%
Random Forest 86.49% 75%
5.4.5 Overall results discussion and conclusion
During the preliminary investigation of the SAFPS data it was determined that
69% of the identity theft victims reported were males compared to only 31% be-
ing female and 45.5% of the victims were between the ages of 28 and 40 years.
These two variables were therefore set as reference variables as they represented
real identity theft incidents. The email survey data was then investigated and
it was found that the average vulnerability on social media sites of male users
was higher than the score for female users. The average vulnerabilities for differ-
ent age groups were highest for ages in the range of 30–40 years. These results
therefore complied with the SAFPS expected results. Relationship diagrams were
constructed during the data mining of the survey data for the 96 variables that
remained after the screening process. The victim percentages for these variables
were compared and it was again found that the average age for victims was 28
129
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.4 Data mining results
years and the victim percentage for males was 3% higher than the victim per-
centage for females. The two most important predictor variables were conistently
expected to be Age and Gender and the Random Forest model confirms the ex-
pection to be true as it ranked Age as the most important predictor variable and
Gender as second most important.
Table 5.8 lists the most important predictor variables according to the Ran-
dom Forest model next to the expected variables that were determined during the
data exploration. The actual predictor variables are listed on the left side of the
table. The expected predictor variables are listed on the right side of the table
and are cross-referenced in bold to indicate which expected variables the predic-
tion model determined to actually be predictor variables. It is observed that 18
of the expected predictor variables turned out to be actual predictor variables
in the Random Forest model. It can therefore be concluded that the predictor
variables are not as obvious as one would think.
The variables listed in Table 5.8 can therefore be used as a guideline when
one creates a social media profile. It is advised that social media users should not
share these attributes on social media platforms to avoid the risk of becoming an
identity theft victim. According to Alfreds (2015c), South Africa is one of the
top three countries internationally with the highest rates of fraud using recycled
deceased identities. It is therefore advised to remove these personal details of
loved ones from their online social media profiles if something should happen to
them.
The PMML code for the Random Forest model can be applied, via a tool such
as the Rapid Deployment Tool in Statistica, to score any new case that completed
a questionaire with the same input variables. It can then be determined if such
an individual classifies as a high risk identity theft victim, when classified as a
victim or a low risk identity theft victim, when classified as a non-victim. If an
individual classifies as a high-risk victim, they should revise their profile on social
media platforms as they have either already been a victim or could be at risk of
becoming one.
As Arthur Conan Doyle said, ‘There is nothing more deceptive than an obvious
fact.’ When it comes to identity theft, we are all possible victims. The only thing
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we have control over is our actions, which can either increase or decrease our
vulnerability. Be wise. Be informed.
Table 5.8: Final Predictor Variables
ID
Important predictor variables
According to Random Forest Model
Rank
(Scale 1–100)
Cross
Referenced
ID
Expected Predictor Variables
Determined by Relationship Diagrams
Refer to
Table
1 Age 100 1 1 Age Average 27.85
2 Gender (Male) 40 2 2 Gender (Male) 3%
3 Race (Facebook) 39 3 Relationship status (Married) 9% lead
4 Cell Number (Any Platform) 39 31 4 Identity number (Any Platform) 12%
5 Race (Any Platform) 39 37 5 Identity number (Facebook) 9%
6 Email (Facebook) 38 6 Physical address (LinkedIn) 9%
7 Cell Number (Facebook) 38 7 Identity number (LinkedIn) 7%
8 Relationship Status (Any Platform) 38 39 8 Physical address (Any Platform) 6%
9 Surname (Youtube) 38 9 Job details (LinkedIn) 5%
10 Relationship Status (Facebook) 38 10 Job details (Any Platform) 5%
11 Platform Subscribtion (Youtube) 37 11 Email address (Other) 5%
12 Job Details (Facebook) 37 27 12 Race (Dating Sites) 5%
13 Name (Youtube) 37 13 Relationship status (Dating Sites) 5%
14 Platform Subscribtion (Pinterest) 36 14 Relationship status (LinkedIn) 5%
15 Surname (Twitter) 36 15 Physical address (Facebook) 4%
16 Email (Youtube) 36 16 Name (LinkedIn) 4%
17 Gender (LinkedIn) 36 23 17 Surname (LinkedIn) 4%
18 Birthday Details (LinkedIn) 35 18 18 Birthday (LinkedIn) 4%
19 Gender (Instagram) 35 19 University/College details (LinkedIn) 4%
20 Platform Subscription (Twitter) 35 20 School details (LinkedIn) 4%
21 Email (Twitter) 35 21 Surname (Any Platform) 4%
22 Gender (Twitter) 34 22 Race (Other) 4%
23 School Details (Facebook) 34 23 Gender (LinkedIn) 3%
24 Gender (YouTube) 34 24 Race (LinkedIn) 3%
25 Surname (Instagram) 33 25 Email (LinkedIn) 3%
26 Email (LinkedIn) 33 25 26 Birthday (Other) 3%
27 School Details (LinkedIn) 33 20 27 Job details (Facebook) 2%
28 Name (Twitter) 33 28 Cell number (LinkedIn) 2%
29 Job Details (Any Platform) 33 10 29 Name (Dating Sites) 2%
30 Birthday Details (Twitter) 32 30 Gender (Dating Sites) 2%
31 Name (Instagram) 32 31 Cell number (Any Platform) 2%
32 Name (Pinterest) 32 32 University/College details (Any Platform) 2%
33 Platform Subscription (Instagram) 31 33 Surname (Other) 2%
34 Patform Subscription (Other) 31 34 Cell number (Other) 2%
35 University Details (LinkedIn) 31 19 35 School details (Any Platform) 1%
36 Physical Address (Facebook) 31 15 36 Surname (Dating Sites) 1%
37 Email (Instagram) 31 37 Race (Any Platform) 1%
38 Relationship status (Married) 31 3 38 Email (Any Platform) 1%
39 Job details (LinkedIn) 31 9 39 Relationship status (Any Platform) 1%
40 Platform Subscription (LinkedIn) 30 40 40 Platform Subscription (LinkedIn) 4%
41 Email (Any Platform) 30 38 41 Platform Subscription (Mxit) 4%
42 Physical Address (Any Platform) 30 8 42 Platform Subscription (Dating Sites) 3%
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and
Recommendations
This chapter presents a short summary of what has been done in the research
study; it gives a conclusion that demonstrates how the study objectives were
satisfied and then ends with a discussion of recommendations for further research.
6.1 Research summary
A literature study was conducted on the topics: identity theft, social media, big
data, Hadoop, the semantic web and data mining. Data was collected from the
SAFPS on historic identity theft cases and data on the social media information-
sharing habits of the SU population was collected via surveys sent by email. The
SAFPS data was used to determine common attributes among identity theft vic-
tims. These attributes were then used as reference variables during the survey
data analysis. The survey data respondents were each assigned a vulnerability
score that was calculated according to the attributes they have shared on so-
cial media platforms and the number of platforms the associated attributes were
shared on. Average vulnerability scores were then calculated for each of the
SAFPS reference variables. The survey data was graphically explored and trans-
formed into a data set that could be mined with prediction models. The CART,
CHAID, Random Forest and Boosted Trees models were applied to the data set
to classify individuals as high-risk or low-risk identity theft victims. The Random
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Forest model predicted victims best, the trained PMML code of the model was
therefore used to score new data. The model was found valid and delivered a
list of high ranked predictor variables of identity theft that it was advised to not
share on social media platforms.
6.2 Conclusion of the research study
The first objective of the study was to determine the attributes that have note-
worthy correlations with victims of identity theft. The data collected from the
SAFPS on identity theft incidents in South Africa was used to determine these
attributes. It was concluded that the attributes Gender and Age were strongly
related to identity theft victims.
The second objective was to develop a method to estimate vulnerability scores
for individuals based on the data they have revealed on social media. Risk factors
were assigned to each of the possible shared attributes and an average vulnera-
bility score was then calculated by the summing of risk factors according to the
number of times they were shared for all attributes divided by the total number
of attributes. These scores were then used in a preliminary investigation to see
if the data set was feasible for the study and it was concluded that the expected
data characteristics were visible, which made the data set applicable.
The third objective was to build a prediction model that best classified iden-
tity theft victims. The following decision trees were explored: CART, CHAID,
Random Forest and Boosted Trees. The Random Forest model performed the
best in victim prediction. Gains charts were used to present model accuracy and
lift charts to show model effectiveness. Both the gains and lift charts suggested
that the Random Forest model performed better than the CART, CHAID and
Boosted Trees models. With these results in combination with the prediction
results it was concluded that the Random Forest model was the prediction model
that best classified the dependent variable, Victim.
The fourth objective was to determine the variables that best predicted identity
theft victims. All prediction models presented a list of important variables. The
final predictor variables were however determined by the model that best classified
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the dependent variable. The top predictor variables for the Random Forest model
were determined according to a 0–100 scale as calculated by the method described
in Breiman et al. (1984). It was concluded that 18 of the expected predictor
variables that were determined during data exploration turned out to be predictor
variables in the Random Forest model.
The fifth objective was to use the prediction model to score new data as ei-
ther at high risk of identity theft or at low risk according to their social media
information sharing habits. The Rapid Deployment Tool in Statistica was used
to apply the trained PMML code of the Random Forest model to a new de-
ployment data set. The PMML code of the CART, CHAID and Boosted Trees
models were applied to the deployment data set to observe how they performed
relative to the Random Forest Model. The Boosted Tree model misclassified all
non-victims and the CHAID model misclassified all victims. These two models
did not therefore present feasible results. The CART model performed the same
as the Random Forest model with the classification of victims, but the Random
Forest model outperformed CART with the classification of non-victims. It was
therefore concluded that the Random Forest model was indeed the best choice
for the prediction model. The PMML code for the Random Forest model could
therefore be used to score new cases as high-risk or low-risk identity theft victims.
It was hypothesised that there is a recognisable difference between the amount
of data that is shared by people who have been identity theft victims compared
to people who have not been offended with the crime. The average vulnerability
score, which was calculated in the preliminary investigation of the survey data,
for previous identity theft victims was reasonably higher than the score for non-
victims, which meant that the attributes that victims shared on social media
were attributes with higher risk factors than that shared by non-victims and the
attributes were shared on more social media sites. The hypothesis was therefore
accepted as the average vulnerability results on the dependent variable Victim
satisfied the statement.
Furthermore it was hypothesised that the attributes commonly found in his-
toric identity theft victim cases are the attributes that will serve as important
predictor variables in a model that classified individuals as high-risk or low-risk
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victims of identity theft. The SAFPS data concluded that the identity theft vic-
tims that were reported consisted of more males compared to females and that
most of the victims were between the ages of 30 and 40 years. These two vari-
ables were therefore set as reference variables as they represented real identity
theft incidents. The email survey data concluded that the average vulnerability
on social media sites of male users was higher than the score for female users.
The average vulnerabilities for different age groups were highest for ages in the
range of 30–40 years. These results therefore complied with the SAFPS expected
results. The relationship diagrams that were constructed during the survey data
mining concluded that the average age for victims was 28 years and the victim
percentage for males was again higher than the victim percentage for females.
The two most important predictor variables were cosistently found to be Age and
Gender and the Random Forest model then confirmed it as Age was ranked as
the most important predictor variable and Gender as the second most important.
The hypothesis was therefore accepted.
Finally it is agreed with Patsakis et al. (2014) that the user determines the
vulnerability of their own personal information on social media platforms. Secu-
rity and privacy settings are available, but they do not guarantee protection from
cybercrimes. If users avoid the sharing of predictor variables they will decrease
their vulnerability on social media, which will decrease their risk of becoming an
identity theft victim.
As mentioned before, South Africa is one of the top three countries interna-
tionally with the highest rates of fraud using recycled deceased identities (Alfreds,
2015c). It is therefore advised to remove these personal details of loved ones from
their online social media profiles if something should happen to them.
6.3 Recommendations
After a comprehensive literature review and reading of the social media privacy
policies included in the study, it was found that the initial research methodology
was not practical and a revised research methodology was suggested. It is however
recommended that for further research big data can be collected, in URI format,
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on the topic. The initial research methodology would then be applicable. More
data would result in more accurate results and if it could be possible to find a
way to legally crawl social media sites, the perfect population could be extracted.
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Appendix A
Privacy Policy Summaries of
Social Media Platforms
The privacy policies included in this study were extracted on 31 July 2016. It
should therefore be noted that changes could have been made to these policies at
the time of reading.
A.1 Facebook privacy policy
Table A.1 displays a short summary of the Facebook privacy policy that was ob-
tained from the official online site. The complete privacy policy can be extracted
from Facebook (2016).
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Table A.1: Summary of Facebook Privacy Policy.
Facebook
Kinds of information collected:
Things users do and information users provide.
Things other users do and information they provide.
Users’ networks and connections.
Information about payments.
Device information.
Information from websites and apps that use Facebook’s services.
Information from third-party partners.
How information is used:
To provide, improve and develop services.
To provide shortcuts and suggestions to users.
To communicate with users.
To show and measure advertisements and services.
To promote safety and security by making use of cookies and similar technologies.
How information is shared:
On Facebook services.
To people users share and communicate with.
Public information is available to anyone on or off Facebook services and can
be seen or accessed through online search engines.
It is shared with apps, websites and third-party integrations on or using Facebook services.
Sharing happens within Facebook companies.
New owners.
Sharing with third-party partners and Customers.
Manage and delete information:
Users can manage their accounts through the activity log tool.
Data is stored for as long as it is necessary to provide products and services to
users and others.
Information associated with users’ accounts will be kept until their account is deleted.
How harm is prevented:
Facebook may access, preserve and share users’ information in response to a legal
request, if Facebook has good belief that the law requires them to do so.
Facebook may access, preserve and share users’ information when they
believe it is necessary to: detect, prevent and address fraud and other
illegal activity, to protect users, others and themselves (this includes investigations).
Operation of global services:
Complies with US-ES, US-Swiss and participates in the Safe Harbor program as set by
the Department of Commerce (Resolves disputes through TRUSTe).
Facebook may share information for purposes described in this policy.
Privacy policy changes:
Users will be notified if privacy policy changes and given opportunity to review
and comment before continuing use of services.
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A.2 LinkedIn privacy policy
A.2 LinkedIn privacy policy
Table A.2 and Table A.3 present a short summary of the LinkedIn privacy policy
that was obtained from the official online site. The complete privacy policy can
be extracted from LinkedIn (2016).
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A.2 LinkedIn privacy policy
Table A.2: Summary of LinkedIn Privacy Policy (a).
LinkedIn
Kinds of information collected:
Information users provide with registration.
Profile information users fill out.
Address book and other services that synchronize with LinkedIn.
When users contact for customer support.
When using LinkedIn sites, applications and advertisements.
Using third-party services and visiting third-party sites.
Cookies.
Advertising technologies and web beacons.
Log files, IP addresses and information about an user’s computer and mobile device.
How information is used:
Users agree that information they provide on their profile can be seen and used by LinkedIn.
LinkedIn communications (messages and emails).
User communications (a recipient can see a user’s name, email address and some network
information).
To conduct research and development and to customise users’ experience.
Third parties using LinkedIn platform services.
Polls and surveys.
Searches.
Groups.
Testimonials and advertisements placed through LinkedIn advertisements.
Talent recruiting, marketing and sales solutions.
Pages for companies, schools, influencers and other entities.
Compliance with legal process and other disclosures.
Disclosure to others as the result of a change in control or sale of LinkedIn Corporation.
Service providers if LinkedIn needs assistance.
Data processing outside the company users live.
How information is shared:
Information may be shared with user’s consent or as required by law.
Shared across LinkedIn’s different services, among companies in the LinkedIn family.
Information is shared with LinkedIn Affiliates.
Information is shared with third-parties (a users’ profile and any data they post can be found by
others through search engines, if public).
Manage and delete information:
Users have rights to access, correct or delete information, and closing their account.
If an account is deleted, LinkedIn will remove all the user’s information within 24 hours.
Data retention – LinkedIn keeps users’ information for as long as their accounts is
active or needed.
Some information is kept even after an account is deleted for example when it is necessary to
comply with LinkedIn obligations , to meet regulatory requirements, resolve
disputes, prevent fraud and abuse, or enforce this agreement.
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Table A.3: Summary of LinkedIn Privacy Policy (b).
LinkedIn
How harm is prevented:
Personal information is protected by using industry-standard safeguards.
LinkedIn takes privacy and security seriously and have enabled HTTPS access to their site,
in addition to existing SSL access over mobile devices.
The internet is not a secure environment – select strong passwords.
LinkedIn do not permit the use of any third-party software. No ‘crawlers’, bots, browser plug-ins,
or browser extensions are permitted to scrape or copy data.
Operation of global services:
Partner with TRUSTe and complies with US-EU and US-Swiss Safe Harbor programs.
Californias Shine the Light Law.
LinkedIn does not share any of users’ personal information with
third parties for direct marketing.
Privacy policy changes:
LinkedIn only notifies users when they make changes to this privacy policy if it affects users’ personal
information, else not.
A.3 Twitter privacy policy
Table A.4 displays a short summary of the Twitter privacy policy that was ob-
tained from the official online site. The complete privacy policy can be extracted
from Twitter (2016).
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Table A.4: Summary of Twitter Privacy Policy.
Twitter
Kinds of information collected:
Basic account information.
Contact information.
Additional information users provide.
Tweets.
Following, lists and other public information.
Location information.
Interaction with links.
Cookies.
Log data – such as IP addresses, browser types, operating systems, the referring web page, pages
visited, location, users’ mobile carriers, device information, search terms and cookie information.
Widget data.
Commerce services – to facilitate future purchases Twitter saves user payment
information (excluding CVV code) and shipping address.
Third parties and affiliates.
Twitter receives users’ information through their various websites, SMS, API’s, email notifications,
applications, buttons, widgets, advertisements, commerce services and other covered services, and from partners
or other third parties.
How information is used:
Twitter engages with service providers to perform functions and provide services to users.
Commerce transactions – to help with future purchases.
As required by law.
Users’ information may be sold or transferred as part of a transaction.
How information is shared:
Users’ information may be shared at their directing such as when they authorise a third-party web
client or application to access their account.
Service providers.
Payment information is shared with the provider, commerce provider, marketplace, or charity.
Government request – information is shared if it complies with the law.
Business transfers, third parties and affiliates.
Manage and delete information:
Users can manage their data with the account settings.
What users say on the Twitter Services may be viewed all around the world instantly.
‘You are what you tweet’.
Search engines and other third parties may still retain copies of users’ public information
even after users have deleted the information or deactivated their account.
How harm is prevented: NA
Operation of global services: NA
Privacy policy changes: Users will be notified about changes via an @Twitter update or via email.
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A.4 Instagram privacy policy
Table A.5 displays a short summary of the Instagram privacy policy that was ob-
tained from the official online site. The complete privacy policy can be extracted
from Instagram (2016).
Table A.5: Summary of Instagram Privacy Policy.
Instagram
Kinds of information collected:
Information users provide Instagram directly – profile and contact details for example.
Finding friends – contact details or third parties connection.
Analytics information – example web pages users visited, add-ons, and other information
that assists Instagram services.
Cookies and similar technologies.
Log file information.
Device identifiers.
Metadata – technical data that is associated with user content.
How information is used:
To help users efficiently access their information after they sign in.
Remember information so that users do not have to re-enter it every time.
Provide personalised content and information to users and others, can include online
advertisements or other forms of marketing.
Provide, improve, test and monitor the effectiveness of Instagram’s services.
Develop and test new products and features.
Monitor metrics such as total number of visitors.
Diagnose or fix technology problems.
Automatically update the Instagram application.
How information
is shared:
Information will not be rented or sold to third-parties outside of Instagram without users’ consent.
Information may be shared with affiliates.
Third-party organisations within the Instagram family.
Service providers.
Third party advertisers.
Users can choose to share information with users that use the API service.
Instagram may transfer users’ information in the event of a change of control.
Responding to legal requests and preventing harm.
Manage and delete information:
After termination or deactivation of an account, Instagram and affiliates may keep users’
information and user information for a commercially reasonable time.
How harm is prevented: Commercially reasonable safeguards are used to keep information secure.
Operation of global services: NA
Privacy policy changes: It is the users own responsibility to review the privacy policy periodically.
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A.5 YouTube privacy policy
Table A.6 displays a short summary of the YouTube privacy policy that was ob-
tained from the official online site. The complete privacy policy can be extracted
from YouTube (2016).
Table A.6: Summary of YouTube Privacy Policy.
YouTube
Kinds of information collected: Any information that is uploaded with videos.
How information is used: Videos are viewed by users all over the globe.
How information is shared: Privacy violation complaints are not accepted from third-parties.
Manage and delete information:
If a privacy complaint is filed, YouTube provides the uploader with an opportunity to
remove the video within 48 hours, if the uploader does not respond – YouTube
will take action.
How harm is prevented:
Content like videos are removed when an individual can be uniquely identifiable by image,
voice, full name, national insurance number, bank account number, or contact
information.
Operation of global services: NA
Privacy policy changes: NA
A.6 Pinterest privacy policy
Table A.7 displays a short summary of the Pinterest privacy policy that was ob-
tained from the official online site. The complete privacy policy can be extracted
from Pinterest (2016).
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Table A.7: Summary of Pinterest Privacy Policy.
Pinterest
Kinds of information collected:
Information the user provides or give permission to obtain (example – name, surname, email,
cell phone, location, etc.).
Whenever the user uses websites, mobile applications or other internet services through Pinterest.
Log data.
Cookie data.
Device information.
Partners and advertisers may share information with Pinterest.
How information is used:
Pinterest uses information collected to provide better products to users, develop
new products, and protect Pinterest and its users.
To offer users customised content, including: suggesting pins or boards they might like and
showing them advertisements they may be interested in.
Send users updates, newsletters, marketing materials and other information that may be of
interest to them.
Help users’ friends and contacts find them on Pinterest.
Respond to users’ questions or comments.
The information Pinterest collect may be personally identifiable or non-personally identifiable.
How information is shared:
Anyone can see the public boards and pins users create, and the profile information they give Pinterest.
Pinterest may make public information available to APIs.
With the user’s consent Pinterest may share information with other services such as Facebook.
When users buy something on Pinterest using their credit card, Pinterest may share their credit card
information, contact information, and other information about the transaction
with the merchant they were buying from.
(The merchants treat this information just as if the user had made a purchase from their website directly,
which means their privacy policies and marketing policies apply to the data users share with them.)
If users buy something on Pinterest via Apple Pay, their credit card number is not shared
to merchants, but contact and transaction info is still.
Pinterest allows third-party companies to audit the delivery and performance of advertisements on Pinterest.
Pinterest may employ third-party companies or individuals to process personal information on their
behalf based on their instructions and in compliance with this policy.
If Pinterest believes that disclosure is reasonable necessary to comply with law, regulation or
legal request, to protect the safety, rights, or property of the public, any person, or Pinterest, or to detect,
prevent or otherwise address fraud, security or technical issues.
Pinterest may engage in a merger, acquisition, bankruptcy, dissolution, reorganisation, or similar
transaction or proceeding that involves the transfer of the information described in this policy.
Pinterest may share aggregated or non-personally identifiable information with partners, advertisers or others.
Manage and delete information:
A user may access and change information on their profile page at any time, choose whether their profile page is available to search engines,
or choose whether others can find their Pinterest account using their email address.
Link or unlink their Pinterest account from an account on another service (like Facebook).
Create or be added to a secret board that is only visible to them and other participants on the board.
Choose whether Pinterest will be customised for them using information from off-Pinterest websites or apps.
Choose whether their purchase on Pinterest will be used to customise recommendations and ads for them.
Pinterest supports the do not track browser setting.
Users may close their account at any time. When users close their account, Pinterest deactivates it and removes their pins and boards from Pinterest.
The browser users use may provide them with the ability to control cookies or other types of local data storage.
Users’ mobile device may provide them with choices around how and whether location or other data is shared with Pinterest.
How harm is
prevented:
NA
Operation of
global services:
NA
Privacy policy
changes:
If the privacy policy is changed and the user continues to use Pinterest after those changes are in effect, they agree to the revised policy.
If the changes are significant, Pinterest may provide more prominent notice or get users’ consent as required by law.
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Table A.8 displays a short summary of the Mxit privacy policy that was obtained
from the official online site. The complete privacy policy is no longer available as
Mxit officially closed the service on 30 September 2016.
Table A.8: Summary of Mxit Privacy Policy.
Mxit
Kinds of information collected:
The user can decide how much information they give Mxit, but users must provide Mxit at least the
minimum information as required by the registration process.
Mxit collects information directly from users.
Mxit receives different types of information about users. Included in this is a user’s personal
information that is needed to create an user account: it includes the following – name, mobile number, ID, username and password.
Other information such as date of birth, gender, interests, the device the user uses, their location
and other information about them can be added to a user’s account.
How information is used:
It is used to deliver services.
To maintain systems.
To improve service offerings to users.
To improve user experience on Mxit.
To make it possible for users to use third-party applications on the platform.
To put together statistics about the use of the services.
How information is shared:
With developers and service providers.
Third-party applications.
Service providers such as advisors or information technology providers.
To generate income – share info with developers, advertisers, and service providers.
To process personal information on servers in other countries.
When required by law to hand over information to the authorities.
Manage and delete information: NA
How harm is prevented:
Users must continuously review the information security practices to make sure no one can gain unauthorised
access to their personal information.
The personal info users share with contacts, other Mxit users, in chat rooms or with developers whose applications
users use is not covered by this privacy policy.
Operation of global services: NA
Privacy policy changes: Changes are announced 14 days before applied, if the user does not agree they may terminate their account.
A.8 Dating Sites privacy policy
In the study it is referred to ‘Dating Sites’ as a whole. It was therefore decided
to look at three randomly selected dating sites that were popular at the time of
research for some insight.
Table A.9 displays a short summary of the dating site Zoosk’s privacy policy
that was obtained from the official online site. The complete privacy policy can
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be extracted from Zoosk (2016).
Table A.9: Summary of Zoosk Privacy Policy.
Zoosk
Kinds of information collected:
Information users provide – (like name, birth date, photographs email address, password, phone number, including mobile
phone number, billing information, credit card information and other contact or demographic information provided, also extra
info such as personal interests, background, gender, age, geographical location and physical characteristics).
Information automatically collected – (like IP address, browser type, internet service provider, platform type, the site from
which the user came and the site to which they are going when they leave Zoosk, date and time stamp and one or more
cookies that may uniquely identify the user’s browser or their account, UDID, mobile
carrier, device manufacturer and phone number).
Cookies and other technologies.
Third party advertisers.
Social networking sites services through a social networking site such as Facebook.
How information is used:
To operate, provide, maintain, develop, deliver, protect, and improve services, products, applications, content and advertising.
To develop new products and services.
To maintain and administer users’ Zoosk account.
To maintain and display users’ Zoosk profile.
To respond to users’ comments and questions and provide customer service.
To detect and prevent abusive, fraudulent, malicious, or potentially illegal activities, and to protect the rights, safety or property of Zoosk users.
To enforce Zoosk’s terms of use agreement.
To keep users posted on Zoosk’s latest product or service announcements, software updates, security alerts and any technical notices.
To communicate with users.
To provide users with confirmation of purchases, invoices, support and administrative messages or notice about changes to Zoosk’s terms, conditions or policies.
To administer any contests or promotions.
To perform other functions as otherwise described to users at the time of collection.
To link or combine information about users with other information Zoosk gets from third-parties to help understand users’ needs and provide them with better service.
Zoosk may store and process personal information in the United States and other countries.
How information is shared:
Users are allowed to share information about them with other individuals and other companies.
Personal info is shared to third parties with users’ consent,
To satisfy applicable law, regulation, legal process or government request.
For the investigation of potential violation of the terms of use agreement.
To defend Zoosk against third party claims or allegations.
For protection against harm.
To detect, prevent or otherwise address fraud, security or technical issues.
In connection with any merger, sale of company assets, reorganisation, financing, change of control or acquisition or in the event of bankruptcy.
With third party vendors, consultants, and other service providers that perform services on Zoosk’s behalf.
Zoosk may also share information with others in an aggregated form that does not directly identify a user.
Manage and delete information:
Users can manage communications from Zoosk with settings.
Remove or block cookies with settings.
Opt out of advertising.
Users can access or change their account with settings.
How harm is prevented:
Zoosk takes reasonable measures to help protect users’ personal information in an effort to prevent
loss, misuse, and unauthorised access, disclosure, alteration and destruction.
Operation of
global services:
NA
Privacy policy
changes:
Zoosk reserves the right to modify this policy from time to time.
If Zoosk makes any changes to the policy, they will change the “last revision’
date below and will post the updated policy on the policy page.
Table A.10 displays a short summary of the dating site C-date’s privacy policy
that was obtained from the official online site. The complete privacy policy can
be extracted from C-date (2016).
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Table A.10: Summary of C-date Privacy Policy.
C-date
Kinds of information collected:
Personal data such as age, gender, zip code, telephone number, email address, evaluation
results of questionnaires, personal statements and pictures posted.
Cookies.
How information is used:
To provide services, contractors and other third parties.
To a buyer or merger in the event of selling.
For the purpose of advertising.
Market research.
For research and analysis.
To subsidiaries and affiliates.
To fulfil the purpose for which users provide it.
With users’ consent.
How information is shared:
C-date may disclose aggregated information about users and information that does not identify
any individual, without restriction.
Third-parties, affiliates or service providers.
If the company should be sold, personal data will be transformed to third-party.
To comply with any court order.
If C-date believes disclosure is necessary to protect rights.
Manage and
delete information:
Users can change account settings to not receive cookies.
How harm is prevented:
Interdate does not sell, trade, or otherwise disclose customer lists or personal data to
unaffiliated third-parties without permission.
C-date has implemented measures designed to secure users’ personal information.
Any payment transactions are encrypted using SSL technology.
Operation of global services: Childrens Online Privacy Protection Act
Privacy policy changes:
Users will be notified by the sending of a notice to their mailboxes if material changes to
how personal information is treated are made.
Table A.11 displays a short summary of the dating site Elitesingles’ privacy
policy that was obtained from the official online site. The complete privacy policy
can be extracted from Elitesingles (2016).
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Table A.11: Summary of Elitesingles Privacy Policy.
Elitesingles
Kinds of information collected:
Info users provide with registration (gender, email, postal code, date of birth, marital status,
education, occupation, income).
For paid membership users must provide their name and surname, bank account details or credit card
information and home address.
Further info collected during site visits are: IP address, page name, date and time of
access, referred URL, session cookies.
How information is used:
Elitesingles may record services users are interested in as well as user traffic patterns.
For statistical purposes.
Users profile info is used to suggest other members for match making.
Other members can see when a user has viewed their profile and vice versa.
Other members can connect with users.
Email notifications and to receive information like specials and partners offers.
Import info from Facebook.
In order to find suitable partners.
How information is shared:
Other members can see users’ profile information.
Third-parties and service providers.
Use of cookies.
Use of analysis programs and remarketing.
Use of google doubleclick.
Use of Facebook, Google+, Twitter and social plugins.
Checking and verification of personal information.
When required by law.
Manage and delete information:
Users can change their message and profile settings.
Right to any time receive information about personal information and settings Elitesingles store to a user’s account.
Users’ right to erase personal information may be limited by legal retention.
How harm is prevented:
Written permission is obtained for collection, collation, processing or disclosure of information.
Personal info is not electronically collected.
Reason for personal data collection will be given in writing.
Record will be kept of personal data during use and at least one year after, dates and third parties.
Obsolete personal data will be destroyed.
Elitesingles uses technological, organizational and physical protection measures.
All info is encrypted with Secure Socket Layer.
Users can decide on settings whether they want to continue to have their profile suggested to other members.
Operation of global services:
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002
Privacy policy changes: NA
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Appendix B
CRISP: Data Understanding –
Variable Description Graphs
B.1 Histograms of shared attributes
Figure B.1: Name shared on
– (None).
Figure B.2: Name shared on
– (Other).
Figure B.3: Name shared on
– (Facebook).
Figure B.4: Name shared on
– (LinkedIn).159
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Figure B.5: Name shared on – (Twit-
ter).
Figure B.6: Name shared on – (Insta-
gram).
Figure B.7: Name shared on –
(YouTube).
Figure B.8: Name shared on – (Pin-
terest).
Figure B.9: Name shared on – (Mxit).
Figure B.10: Name shared on – (Dat-
ing Sites).
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Figure B.11: Surname shared on –
(None).
Figure B.12: Surname shared on –
(Other).
Figure B.13: Surname shared on –
(Facebook).
Figure B.14: Surname shared on –
(LinkedIn).
Figure B.15: Surname shared on –
(Twitter).
Figure B.16: Surname shared on –
(Instagram).
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Figure B.17: Surname shared on –
(YouTube).
Figure B.18: Surname shared on –
(Pinterest).
Figure B.19: Surname shared on –
(Mxit).
Figure B.20: Surname shared on –
(Dating Sites).
Figure B.21: Identity Number
shared on – (None).
Figure B.22: Identity Number
shared on – (Other).
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Figure B.23: Identity Number
shared on – (Facebook).
Figure B.24: Identity Number
shared on – (LinkedIn).
Figure B.25: Identity Number
shared on – (Twitter).
Figure B.26: Identity Number
shared on – (Instagram).
Figure B.27: Identity Number
shared on – (YouTube).
Figure B.28: Identity Number
shared on – (Pinterest).
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Figure B.29: Identity Number
shared on – (Mxit).
Figure B.30: Identity Number
shared on – (Dating Sites).
Figure B.31: Birthday shared on –
(None).
Figure B.32: Birthday shared on –
(Other).
Figure B.33: Birthday shared on –
(Facebook).
Figure B.34: Birthday shared on –
(LinkedIn).
164
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
B.1 Histograms of shared attributes
Figure B.35: Birthday shared on –
(Twitter).
Figure B.36: Birthday shared on –
(Instagram).
Figure B.37: Birthday shared on –
(YouTube).
Figure B.38: Birthday shared on –
(Pinterest).
Figure B.39: Birthday shared on –
(Mxit).
Figure B.40: Birthday shared on –
(Dating Sites).
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Figure B.41: Gender shared on –
(None).
Figure B.42: Gender shared on –
(Other).
Figure B.43: Gender shared on –
(Facebook).
Figure B.44: Gender shared on –
(LinkedIn).
Figure B.45: Gender shared on –
(Twitter).
Figure B.46: Gender shared on – (In-
stagram).
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Figure B.47: Gender shared on –
(YouTube).
Figure B.48: Gender shared on –
(Pinterest).
Figure B.49: Gender shared on –
(Mxit).
Figure B.50: Gender shared on –
(Dating Sites).
Figure B.51: Race shared on –
(None).
Figure B.52: Race shared on –
(Other).
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Figure B.53: Race shared on – (Face-
book).
Figure B.54: Race shared on –
(LinkedIn).
Figure B.55: Race shared on –
(Twitter).
Figure B.56: Race shared on – (In-
stagram).
Figure B.57: Race shared on –
(YouTube).
Figure B.58: Race shared on – (Pin-
terest).
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Figure B.59: Race shared on –
(Mxit).
Figure B.60: Race shared on – (Dat-
ing Sites).
Figure B.61: Physical Address
shared on – (None).
Figure B.62: Physical Address
shared on – (Other).
Figure B.63: Physical Address
shared on – (Facebook).
Figure B.64: Physical Address
shared on – (LinkedIn).
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Figure B.65: Physical Address
shared on – (Twitter).
Figure B.66: Physical Address
shared on – (Instagram).
Figure B.67: Physical Address
shared on – (YouTube).
Figure B.68: Physical Address
shared on – (Pinterest).
Figure B.69: Physical Address
shared on – (Mxit).
Figure B.70: Physical Address
shared on – (Dating Sites).
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Figure B.71: Email shared on –
(None).
Figure B.72: Email shared on –
(Other).
Figure B.73: Email shared on –
(Facebook).
Figure B.74: Email shared on –
(LinkedIn).
Figure B.75: Email shared on –
(Twitter).
Figure B.76: Email shared on – (In-
stagram).
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Figure B.77: Email shared on –
(YouTube).
Figure B.78: Email shared on –
(Pinterest).
Figure B.79: Email shared on –
(Mxit).
Figure B.80: Email shared on –
(Dating Sites).
Figure B.81: Cellphone Number
shared on – (None).
Figure B.82: Cellphone Number
shared on – (Other).
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Figure B.83: Cellphone Number
shared on – (Facebook).
Figure B.84: Cellphone Number
shared on – (LinkedIn).
Figure B.85: Cellphone Number
shared on – (Twitter).
Figure B.86: Cellphone Number
shared on – (Instagram).
Figure B.87: Cellphone Number
shared on – (YouTube).
Figure B.88: Cellphone Number
shared on – (Pinterest).
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Figure B.89: Cellphone Number
shared on – (Mxit).
Figure B.90: Cellphone Number
shared on – (Dating Sites).
Figure B.91: Relationship Status
shared on – (None).
Figure B.92: Relationship Status
shared on – (Other).
Figure B.93: Relationship Status
shared on – (Facebook).
Figure B.94: Relationship Status
shared on – (LinkedIn).
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Figure B.95: Relationship Status
shared on – (Twitter).
Figure B.96: Relationship Status
shared on – (Instagram).
Figure B.97: Relationship Status
shared on – (YouTube).
Figure B.98: Relationship Status
shared on – (Pinterest).
Figure B.99: Relationship Status
shared on – (Mxit).
Figure B.100: Relationship
Status shared on – (Dating Sites).
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Figure B.101: School Details
shared on – (None).
Figure B.102: School Details
shared on – (Other).
Figure B.103: School Details
shared on – (Facebook).
Figure B.104: School Details
shared on – (LinkedIn).
Figure B.105: School Details
shared on – (Twitter).
Figure B.106: School Details
shared on – (Instagram).
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Figure B.107: School Details
shared on – (YouTube).
Figure B.108: School Details
shared on – (Pinterest).
Figure B.109: School Details
shared on – (Mxit).
Figure B.110: School Details
shared on – (Dating Sites).
Figure B.111: University Details
shared on – (None).
Figure B.112: University Details
shared on – (Other).
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Figure B.113: University Details
shared on – (Facebook).
Figure B.114: University Details
shared on – (LinkedIn).
Figure B.115: University Details
shared on – (Twitter).
Figure B.116: University Details
shared on – (Instagram).
Figure B.117: University Details
shared on – (YouTube).
Figure B.118: University Details
shared on – (Pinterest).
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Figure B.119: University Details
shared on – (Mxit).
Figure B.120: University Details
shared on – (Dating Sites).
Figure B.121: Job Details shared
on – (None).
Figure B.122: Job Details shared
on – (Other).
Figure B.123: Job Details shared
on – (Facebook).
Figure B.124: Job Details shared
on – (LinkedIn).
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Figure B.125: Job Details shared
on – (Twitter).
Figure B.126: Job Details shared
on – (Instagram).
Figure B.127: Job Details shared
on – (YouTube).
Figure B.128: Job Details shared
on – (Pinterest).
Figure B.129: Job Details shared
on – (Mxit).
Figure B.130: Job Details shared
on – (Dating Sites).
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Figure B.131: Income shared on –
(None).
Figure B.132: Income shared on –
(Other).
Figure B.133: Income shared on –
(Facebook).
Figure B.134: Income shared on –
(LinkedIn).
Figure B.135: Income shared on –
(Twitter).
Figure B.136: Income shared on –
(Instagram).
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Figure B.137: Income shared on –
(YouTube).
Figure B.138: Income shared on –
(Pinterest).
Figure B.139: Income shared on –
(Mxit).
Figure B.140: Income shared on –
(Dating Sites).
Figure B.141: Credit Details
shared on – (None).
Figure B.142: Credit Details
shared on – (Other).
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Figure B.143: Credit Details
shared on – (Facebook).
Figure B.144: Credit Details
shared on – (LinkedIn).
Figure B.145: Credit Details
shared on – (Twitter).
Figure B.146: Credit Details
shared on – (Instagram).
Figure B.147: Credit Details
shared on – (YouTube).
Figure B.148: Credit Details
shared on – (Pinterest).
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Figure B.149: Credit Details
shared on – (Mxit).
Figure B.150: Credit Details
shared on – (Dating Sites).
Figure B.151: Victim Type (1). Figure B.152: Victim Type (2).
Figure B.153: Victim Type (3). Figure B.154: Victim Type (4).
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B.1 Histograms of shared attributes
Figure B.155: Victim Type (5).
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B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
The relationship diagrams included in this section present the identity theft victim
percentages for the shared attributes according to the various social media sites’s
non-subscribers versus subscribers.
Figure B.156: Victim % for Name
(Facebook Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.157: Victim % for Name
(LinkedIn Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.158: Victim % for
Name (Twitter Non-Subscribers
vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.159: Victim % for Name
(Instagram Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
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Figure B.160: Victim % for Name
(YouTube Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.161: Victim % for Name
(Pinterest Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.162: Victim % for Name
(Dating Sites Non-Subscribers
vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.163: Victim % for
Name (Other Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.164: Victim % for
Surname (All vs. None).
Figure B.165: Victim % for
Surname (Facebook Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
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B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
Figure B.166: Victim %
for Surname (LinkedIn Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.167: Victim %
for Surname (Twitter Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.168: Victim % for
Surname (Instagram Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.169: Victim %
for Surname (YouTube Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.170: Victim %
for Surname (Pinterest Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.171: Victim % for
Surname (Dating Sites Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
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B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
Figure B.172: Victim %
for Surname (Other Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.173: Victim % for
Identity Number (All vs.
None).
Figure B.174: Victim % for
Identity Number (Facebook
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.175: Victim % for
Identity Number (LinkedIn
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.176: Victim % for
Birthday (All vs. None).
Figure B.177: Victim % for
Birthday (Facebook Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
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B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
Figure B.178: Victim % for
Birthday (LinkedIn Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.179: Victim %
for Birthday (Twitter Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.180: Victim % for
Birthday (Instagram Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.181: Victim % for
Birthday (YouTube Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.182: Victim % for
Birthday (Pinterest Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.183: Victim %
for Birthday (Other Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
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Figure B.184: Victim % for
Gender (All vs. None).
Figure B.185: Victim %
for Gender (Facebook Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.186: Victim %
for Gender (LinkedIn Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.187: Victim %
for Gender (Twitter Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.188: Victim %
for Gender (Instagram Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.189: Victim %
for Gender (YouTube Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
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B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
Figure B.190: Victim %
for Gender (Pinterest Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.191: Victim % for
Gender (Dating Sites Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.192: Victim % for
Gender (Other Non-Subscribers
vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.193: Victim % for Race
(All vs. None).
Figure B.194: Victim % for Race
(Facebook Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.195: Victim % for Race
(LinkedIn Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
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B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
Figure B.196: Victim % for
Race (Twitter Non-Subscribers
vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.197: Victim % for Race
(Instagram Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.198: Victim % for Race
(YouTube Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.199: Victim % for Race
(Pinterest Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.200: Victim % for Race
(Dating Sites Non-Subscribers
vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.201: Victim % for
Race (Other Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
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B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
Figure B.202: Victim % for
Physical Address (All vs.
None).
Figure B.203: Victim % for
Physical Address (Facebook
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.204: Victim % for
Physical Address (LinkedIn
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.205: Victim % for
Email (All vs. None).
Figure B.206: Victim %
for Email (Facebook Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.207: Victim %
for Email (LinkedIn Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).194
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B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
Figure B.208: Victim % for
Email (Twitter Non-Subscribers
vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.209: Victim %
for Email (Instagram Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.210: Victim %
for Email (YouTube Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.211: Victim %
for Email (Pinterest Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.212: Victim % for
Email (Other Non-Subscribers
vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.213: Victim % for
Cellphone Number (All vs.
None).
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B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
Figure B.214: Victim % for
Cellphone Number (Facebook
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.215: Victim % for
Cellphone Number (LinkedIn
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.216: Victim % for
Cellphone Number (Twitter
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.217: Victim % for
Cellphone Number (Insta-
gram Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.218: Victim % for
Cellphone Number (Other Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.219: Victim % for
Relationship Status (All vs.
None).196
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Figure B.220: Victim % for
Relationship Status (Face-
book Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.221: Victim %
for Relationship Status
(LinkedIn Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.222: Victim % for
Relationship Status (In-
stagram Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.223: Victim % for
Relationship Status (Dating
Sites Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.224: Victim % for
School Details (All vs. None).
Figure B.225: Victim % for
School Details (Facebook
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
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B.2 Relationship diagrams of shared attributes
Figure B.226: Victim % for
School Details (LinkedIn
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.227: Victim % for
School Details (Instagram
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.228: Victim % for
University Details (All vs.
None).
Figure B.229: Victim % for
University Details (Face-
book Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.230: Victim % for
University Details (LinkedIn
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
Figure B.231: Victim % for
University Details (Twitter
Non-Subscribers vs. Sub-
scribers).
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Figure B.232: Victim % for
University Details (In-
stagram Non-Subscribers vs.
Subscribers).
Figure B.233: Victim % for Job
Details (All vs. None).
Figure B.234: Victim % for
Job Details (Facebook Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
Figure B.235: Victim % for
Job Details (LinkedIn Non-
Subscribers vs. Subscribers).
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